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A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers
Ronald J. Gilson*
Tender offers present an obvious and inherent conflict of interest
between management and shareholders. On the one hand, an offer
provides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a
substantial premium over market price. On the other hand, the
tender offer is the principal mechanism by which management can
be forcibly unseated from control.' It should thus come as no surprise that management often resists outsiders' efforts to direct tender
offers at its shareholders. The form of that resistance, however, is
somewhat surprising. Because the tender offer is the only form of
corporate acquisition addressed directly to the target's shareholders,
one might expect defensive tactics initiated by management to focus
on persuading shareholders that the proffered transaction was not in
their best interests. An offer would then fail because target shareholders found it unattractive. Reality, however, differs from expectation. Major forms of defensive tactics achieve success not because
they convince target shareholders to retain their shares, but because
they prevent the offer from being made, or if made, consummated,
and thereby ensure that shareholders cannot make, from management's perspective, the "wrong" decision.2
*
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first place.
1. Se text accompanying note 95 in&ra.
2. The literature cataloguing the array of defensive tactics which have been developed is
vast. Eg., E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERISTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS
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Courts and regulatory authorities have long recognized this conflict between management's wish to retain control and the shareholders' wish to have access to -the highest price for their stock.
Responding to cases arising out of the first postwar acquisition
wave, 3 the Delaware Supreme Court first confronted the conflict
more than 20 years ago,4 and the Securities Exchange Commission,
in settings where a defensive tactic requires shareholder approval, has
since 1969 required explicit disclosure of the potential foreclosure of
shareholder access to desirable offers.' But despite this long-standing
recognition, state corporation law's resolution of the conflict continues to turn on management's motive in defeating the tender offer and
thereby preventing a shift in control. In this article I will argue that
emphasizing managerial motives cannot resolve the conflict and, indeed, does no more than offer a pretense for believing that the conflict does not exist.
The difficulty with the traditional approach, however, goes beyond the uncertainties of motivational analysis. It is not the reason
for management's action which creates the conflict, but the fact that
management acts at all. Resolving the conflict unavoidably requires
delineating the appropriate roles of management and shareholders in
control transactions. This effort, in turn, is possible only by expanding the sources which courts have traditionally considered relevant in developing corporation law. I will argue here that an
appropriate allocation of authority between management and shareholders in the modern public corporation and, therefore, resolution
of the conflict of interest inherent in the tender offer process, can be
achieved only by carefully examining the entire structure of the modern corporation. And while the broad outline of this structure is
sketched by the typical state enabling statute, its picture is completed
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977); P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH
TENDER OFFERS (1977); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS, DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND
PLANNING (1979); M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEEZEOUTS (1978);

Hochman & Folger, Deftecting Takeovers: Charter and Bylaw Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537

(1979); Reuben & Elden, How to Be a Target Company, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 423 (1978);
Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433 (1977).

3. G.

BENTSON, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REME-

DIES 5-7 (1980) discusses the volume and timing of acquisitions since 1895.

4. Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); see Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.

494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962); Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
5. Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements; Anti-takeover or Similar Proposals,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230, reprintedin [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,748, at 80,985 (Oct. 13, 1978).
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by nonlegal forces deriving from the markets in which the corporation and its participants function.
Part I of this article critically examines the traditional approach
to regulating management efforts to prevent changes of control.
Having argued that the traditional approach is incapable of resolving the conflict of interest presented by management defensive tactics, I will then offer in Part II what I term a "structural approach"
to the problem. This approach exposes the invalidity of defensive
tactics in tender offers and delineates a general principle governing
management's appropriate role in the tender offer process. In Part
III I address the various arguments used to justify management discretion to block a tender offer, and in Part IV describe the role which
remains for management, a role substantially more limited than that
management currently assigns to itself. Finally, in Part V I suggest a
rule which implements the structural approach and then consider
anticipated criticism of the rule.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN
TAKEOVERS:

APPLYING THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE IN

CONTROL SETTINGS

In traditional terms, the question posed by management's implementing defensive tactics in response to a tender offer is whether
management has acted in its own self-interest at the expense of the
shareholders. Cast in doctrinal terms, the attack on such activities
would be framed in terms of management's violating its fiduciary
duty. Examining the development and content of traditional fiduciary analysis, however, demonstrates that it is incapable of resolving
the problem posed by defensive tactics. Under prevailing legal standards, the common measure of fiduciary obligation is virtually without content where the conflict of interest triggering its application
concerns maintaining control.
The scope of management's fiduciary responsibility and the
measure of its discharge are traditionally described by the content of
and interplay between two statements of obligation-the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty-and the corresponding standards by which
courts measure discharge of those obligations-the business judgment rule and the fairness test. The statements of obligation are in
themselves unremarkable. The duty of care states that management
owes the corporation reasonable diligence described by a traditional
negligence formula: "A director shall perform his duties . . .with

such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
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under similar circumstances." 6 The duty of loyalty requires only
that the director's dealings with the corporation be consistent with
the "fiduciary" position held.' In both cases, the standards by which
the discharge of these obligations is measured are of real significance.
A. Duy of Care.- The BusinessJudgment Rule
The substance of the duty of care is contained in the measure of
its discharge, the business judgment rule: "Absent bad faith or some
other corrupt motive, directors are normally not liable to the corporation for mistakes of judgment, whether those mistakes are classified
as mistakes of fact or mistakes of law." 8 In practice, however, the
rule functions less as a standard of management conduct than as a
statement ofjudicial restraint: "[T]he liability aspect of the rule may
well have been incidental to its principal function. The rule is more
likely to have survived because it functioned as a quasi-jurisdictional
barrier to prevent courts. . . from exercising regulatory powers over
the activities of corporate managers." 9 Put this way, the business
judgment rule does not express the measure by which a court determines whether management has discharged its duty of care; rather,
its application reflects a conclusion that the management action in
question will not be reviewed at all.' 0
6. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2D § 35 (Supp. 1977). The precise formulation differs from state to state. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977) with N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). The statutes speak of a director's duty of care,
but the duty extends to management as well. See, e.g., H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 453-57 (2d ed. 1970).
7. See, e.g., H. HENN, supra note 6, at 457-59.
8. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979). The recent popularity of the business judgment rule to justify the
dismissal of shareholder derivative litigation has resulted in a flurry ofjudicial restatements of
the principle, of which Cramer is one. See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980) (dismissal not compelled by decision of independent directors not to sue). See generally Dent, The
Powerof Directorsto Terminate ShareholderLitigation: The Death of the DerivativeSuit?, 75 Nw. U.
L. REV. 96 (1980).
9. Manne, Our Two CorporationSystems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 271
(1967); see Note, The Continuing Viability ofthe BusinessJudgmentRule as a GuideforJudicialRestraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 562, 564 (1967).
10. This view is consistent with Professor Bishop's oft-cited comment that "[t]he search
for cases in which directors of industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits
for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in
a very large haystack." Bishop, Sitting Ducks andDecoy Duck. New Trends in the Indemnjflcationof
Corporate Directors and Offwers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). It has been recently argued
that even those cases, such as Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940), commonly cited as the
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The courts' abdication of regulatory authority through the business judgment rule may well be the most significant common law
contribution to corporate governance. Although critics have complained that the "[d]irectors' duty of due care has almost been interpreted out of existence,"" a broader judicial role is difficult to justify.
First, courts are ill-suited to review the wisdom of complex business
judgments;' 2 it is, for example, almost impossible to distinguish between acts of corporate social responsibility and acts of long-term
profit maximization. 3 Second, even if such a review were possible, it
seems virtually certain that the game would not be worth playing.
By definition, the issue of managerial performance arises only after a decision has turned out badly, and a court could accomplish
little at this stage. The impact of the court's decision on future management does not justify judicial review. A general directive to be
wise rather than foolish is of little help. More specific remarks concerning the wisdom of the competing alternatives and the manner in
which they might better have been evaluated, even if correct, are
unlikely to prove a source of guidance for future managers. And, in
any event, litigation is an unjustifiably expensive way to develop a
case study to aid in future business decisions.
Nor can more rigorous judicial review of managements' business
decisions be justified as a mechanism of shareholder protection. The
risk that the corporation will not succeed in the marketplace due to
poor managerial judgment relative to the competition is reflected in
the price paid for the stock. Little controversy remains concerning
the proposition that the market for most publicly traded securities is
efficient in the semistrong form; that is, that the price of the security
at any time reflects all public information about a company, including knowledge about management's abilities and its attitude toward
rare examples of violations of the duty of care, are explainable only on the basis of other
concerns. Phillips, MnagerialMisuse ofProperty: The $yntesizitng Threadin CorporateDoctrine, 32

RUTGERs L. REV. 184, 203-09 (1979).
11. Weiss, Disclosureand CorporateAccountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 587 (1979); see Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).

12. On occasion this point is acknowledged by a court asked to consider applying the
business judgment rule. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) ("It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at
least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments."); see
Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modem Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 399, 421-22

(1962).
13. Engel, An Approach to CorporateSocial Respoarsbility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1979).
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risky ventures.' 4 Shareholders can cheaply insure against the various
risks of business failure by investing in a diversified portfolio.' 5
There is no reason for management to insure separately against only
one of the causes-poor business judgment.
Finally, judicial review, and the resulting potential for personal
liability, cannot be justified as a necessary incentive for managers to
behave responsibly. It is now widely recognized that a variety of
markets-product, employment, capital, and corporate controlconstrain inefficient management performance without the enormous transaction costs associated with litigation. 16 In short, the business judgment rule's wisdom-its declination to provide judicial
regulation when other forces more cheaply accomplish the same
end-is precisely what generates its most persistent criticism. It also,
however, identifies the limits of its application.
B. Duty of Loyaly." The Poliy ConWlct/Primay Purpose Test
While the business judgment rule acts as a jurisdictional barrier
to review of most managerial decisions, the common law also recognizes that regulation of management conduct is appropriate where
management has a conflict of interest. Drawing on trust law doctrine
by analogy, the duty of loyalty originally prohibited transactions between a corporation and its management. 17 This restriction, however, was bent over time to reflect commercial necessity. Prohibition
gave way to an overriding emphasis on the substantive fairness of the
transaction.18 In contrast to judicial restraint under the business
judgment rule, courts adopted an active regulatory posture with respect to transactions posing conflicts of interest: A court would "review such a contract and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and
would invalidate the contract if it was found to be unfair to the cor14. See Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efienqr, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 96
(1978) ("[Tjhere is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the efficient market hypothesis."). For discussion of the empirical
evidence, see G. FOSTER, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS (1978) (describing post-1973
studies); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97

(1973).
15. See note 121 infra and accompanying text.
16. Among recent works by lawyers, see, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
300-13 (2d ed. 1977); R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 5-46 (1978); An-

derson, ConA'ts of Interest: Eftien, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738,
784-87 (1978); Werner, Management,Stock Market and CorporateRefonn: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 389 (1977).
17. See generaly Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35 (1966); Phillips, supra
note 10.
18. The classic formulation of this development is that of Harold Marsh, supra note 17.
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poration." 19 To be sure, fairness did not offer talismanic precision. A
"fair" price is no more than one set somewhere between the lowest
price a seller will accept and the highest price a buyer will pay. But
the concept does offer an objective measure; recourse to comparable
market transactions is possible and appraisals, although inexact, are
available. This allows the structuring of beneficial transactions with
some certainty of their consequences and without enormous regulatory costs.2 ° In short, the fairness standard is a thoroughly respectable rule of law as applied to the area of its original application.
The fairness standard, however, has been an inadequate measure
of management's discharge of its duty of loyalty in the area of particular concern here-its application in the context of change of control. Indeed, it was never tried. There is little question that
management is subject to a conflict of interest when confronted with
a proposal for the corporation's acquisition. As Harold Marsh has
commented, "It is impossible to command the directors in this situation to avoid any conflict of interest, since it has been unavoidably
thrust upon them."' Because corporate statutes commonly require
the approval of the target's board of directors before a proposed
merger or sale of assets can even be put to the shareholders, most
acquisitions cannot be undertaken without management consent.2 2
As a result, management can reject offers beneficial to shareholders
to retain the emoluments, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, that
flow from a position of high authority in a public corporation. Alternatively, control over access to shareholders gives management the
19. Marsh, supra note 17, at 43.
20. Professor Phillips has recently argued that the evolution of the fairness standard
represents yet another instance of the economic efficiency of the common law. Phillips, supra
note 10. One cost of contracting is the production of information about the other partyintegrity, truthfulness, credit, etc.-necessary to successful negotiations. Where the parties
have a preexisting relationship, as that between a director and the corporation, costs are
lower because the parties already have the benefit of the information concerning each other
resulting from the preexisting relationship. The problem of conflict of interest can then be
characterized as one of allocating the savings resulting from reduced transaction costs, and
the allocation principle can be characterized as fairness. Id. at 191-92. A similar point is
made in R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 34-35. For a comparable argument in a related context, see Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 297 (1974).
21. Marsh, supra note 17, at 60; see Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Wh CorporateDirectorsHave
a Right to Resist Tender Ofers, 61 CHI. B. REc. 152, 158 (1979). The inevitability of the conflict
has also been recognized judicially: "[W]henever a tender offer is extended and the management of the threatened company resists, the officers and directors may be accused of trying to
preserve their jobs at the expense of the corporation." Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Good1969).
rich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill.
22. See notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:819

power to "sell" that access to an offeror for such things as favorable
employment contracts and attractive treatment of existing fringe
benefits like stock options.2 3 Thus, it is impossible to identify at the
outset any path management might take which would eliminate the
inherent conflict of interest; any action, whether rejection or approval, reflects the potential for diversion of benefit to management
and away from shareholders.2 4
A potential acquisition thus seems the paradigmatic setting for
judicial regulation of management conduct. While the absence of
judicial review was sensible in nonconflict settings because other constraints protected shareholders, the conflict of interest inherent in a
potential change in control called for "rigid and careful scrutiny" of
the fairness of management conduct. But while doctrinal logic demanded such a review, it did not occur. Faced with the problem of
attempting to police management behavior in this setting, the courts
abdicated, albeit, I will suggest, in an inventive manner.
The difficulty in policing management conduct in connection
with changes of control, and the devices by which the courts chose to
avoid the task, can best be seen by considering two common defensive tactics. In the first, a third party acquires a significant minority
of shares25 and seeks either to acquire the remainder of the target's
shares or to make substantial changes in the target's operations. Target management opposes either course and, after more or less conflict, the target corporation resolves the issue by repurchasing the
dissident's shares at a price higher than market. 6 In the second, an
offeror announces its intent to tender for control and target management takes action-like placing a significant amount of the target's
common stock in hands sympathetic to management's desire to re23. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110,
117-18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Marketfor Corporate Control]; Manne, Some TheoreticalAspects
of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1437-38 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Share Voting].
24. The third possibility, neutrality, is not possible for a merger or sale of assets, which
require director approval. See note 90 infra. For a tender offer, it has much the effect of
approval and is subject to similar problems.
25. A pre-offer accumulation of a significant position in the target's stock, now commonly referred to as making a "block purchase," is intended both to exert leverage over the
target and to prevent others from joining the bidding for the target. 1 M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 57; Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to NegotiatedCorporateAcquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1679 (1979). A block purchase also acts
as insurance against loss if a competing offeror is ultimately successful. See notes 184-87 infra
and accompanying text.
26. The financial characteristics of some recent transactions of this type are described in
More Firns PayingPreminum Pricesto Wrest SharesfiomAntagonists, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1981, at 21,
col. 4.
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main independent-which prevents the change in control from occurring.
In the first setting, where the management action taken-repurchase of the outsider's stock-has as its announced purpose preventing a shift in control of the corporation, the conflict of interest is
apparent. Reviewing management's action under the fairness standard, however, presents substantial difficulties. Inquiry could be
made concerning whether the price paid by the company was fair,
but in that sense, the transaction was arm's length; management had
no interest in paying more for the shares than was necessary to convince the holder to sell. 7 Moreover, that the price was "fair" only
demonstrates the irrelevancy of the inquiry. Management's conflict
of interest was not in the price paid, but in the decision to acquire the
shares at all. Applying a fairness standard to this decision, however,
requires a court to determine whether it was "fair" for control to
remain with management rather than shift to the offeror. And this
inquiry must necessarily focus on whether the shareholders would be
better off with existing management or by selling their shares. But
this is an investment decision, made continually by shareholders in
deciding whether to sell their shares, and raises the same issue ofjudicial competence which justifies a restrictive judicial role with respect
to the duty of care.2
In the second setting, where the management action taken-a
sale of target shares to a friendly party-has the effect of blocking a
potential change in control, a court could also evaluate whether the
price received for the shares was fair. As in the first setting, however,
inquiry into the fairness of the price is beside the point; management's conflict of interest goes not to the commercial reasonableness
of the defensive action's terms, but to the decision to block a change
in control. As in the first setting, a fairness review of the relevant
conflict forces the court to consider precisely the factors which the
business judgment rule excludes from consideration.
The manner in which the courts sidestepped this dilemma is a
marvel of doctrinal development. The first setting is recognizable as
Chef v. Mathes,2 9 where the Delaware Supreme Court avoided the
27. It is true, however, that management's conflict of interest impacts management's
ability to bargain strategically. Thus, management may be less inclined to engage in hard
bargaining than might the shareholders.
28. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text; M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CORPORATION 34 (1976) (noting difficulty of applying "usual conflict of interest rules"
where there is "no market against which the transaction can be measured").
29. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). For similar situations, see, e.g., Heine v.
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problem by shifting the focus of the inquiry. If the court was illequipped to review the fairness of management's belief that it was
the better repository for future control of the corporation, it was at
least competent to engage in an inquiry with which it was familiar, a
review of motive:
[T]he allegation is that the true motives behind such purchases
were improperly centered upon perpetuation of control. . . . [I]f
the actions of the board were motivated by a sincere belief that the
buying out of the dissident stockholder was necessary to maintain
what the board believed to be proper business practices, the board
will not be held liable for such decision. . . . On the other hand,
if the board has acted solely or primarily because of the desire to
perpetuate themselves30in office, the use of corporate funds for such
purposes is improper.
Recognizing that inventive counsel could always discover a conflict
over policy between management and an insurgent, the court required an additional showing: that the board's determination that a
policy conflict existed was based on "reasonable investigation."' 3
While the Cheff decision has been extensively criticized,3 2 note
how neatly the court avoided the fairness dilemma. A conflict of interest existed which, in the court's view and, I think, in fact, was not
subject to a traditional fairness review. An analysis of management's
motives then served as a surrogate for a fairness review to validate
the transaction: Where management's investigation demonstrates
that a policy difference was the motivation for the transaction, then
the conflict of interest has been exorcised. Absent a conflict of interSignal Cos. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch. 1977). See generally Nathan & Sobel, Corporate
Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545 (1980).
30. 41 Del. Ch.at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
31. Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555. But management can easily overcome this hurdle by
developing appropriate documents. See Israels, CorporatePurchase oflts Own Shares-Are There
New Overtones?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 620, 624 (1965). For proxy fights, the policy conflict requirement is, similarly, almost without content. See note 92 infira and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Brudney, FiduciagIdeology in TransactionsAecting CorporateControl, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 259, 270 (1966); Israels, supra note 31, at 624. The distinction between self-perpetuation and conflict over policy originally surfaced as the standard which determined whether
incumbent management could use corporate funds in a proxy contest. See Campbell v.
Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch.563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane
Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955). One might justify expenditure of
corporate funds in a proxy contest because the funds are used to provide shareholders with
information that will help them decide how to vote. But expenditure of funds to repurchase a
potential tender offeror's shares serves not to aid the shareholder's decision between competing contestants for control, but to foreclose that decision entirely. See M. EISENBERO, supra
note 28, at 105 n.31.
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est, the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of review,
precisely the standard applied by the court in Che2ff
[T]he directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and reasonable investigation; the directors will not be penalized for an
appeared reasonable
honest mistake of judgment, if the judgment
a3
at the time the decision was made.
Since management can almost always find a conflict over policy
between itself and an insurgent,3 4 the motive analysis collapses into
the business judgment standard. And while this approach neither
solved nor addressed management's conflict of interest, it did eliminate substantive review of questions which the court was institutionally incompetent to resolve.
The second setting arose in Northwest Zndustries, Inc. v. B.F Goodrich
Co. 35 Goodrich was a participant with Gulf Oil in a joint venture
which both had concluded would be more valuable if owned by either entirely. Despite extensive negotiations, the parties could not
agree upon a price at which Goodrich would acquire Gulf's interest,
and so the matter stood for some four years. Then, ten days after the
announcement of a tender offer for Goodrich by Northwest, negotiations reopened and, in a single day, without further study, Goodrich
management agreed to acquire Gulf's interest in exchange for
700,000 shares of authorized but unissued Goodrich common stock.36
The Goodrich board approved the transaction the following day on
the basis of "a hastily prepared two page memorandum and a one
page statistical analysis of the transaction. '' 7 Northwest sued to
block the transaction, claiming that the stock issuance was a mechanism to defeat the Northwest tender.38
33. 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
34. See, e.g., Braude v. Havenner, 38 Cal. App. 3d 526, 532, 113 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1st
Dist. 1974) ("[E]very contest involves or can be made to involve issues of policy.").
35. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. I1. 1969).
36. The court noted that "[w]hile Gulf's officers had updated their 1965 studies of
Chemicals [the joint venture], the only Goodrich documents were a brief, handwritten memorandum of possible valuations of Gulf's one-half interest and a sheet of paper containing
longhand calculations." I. at 709 n.3.
37. Id. at 709.
38. Although the court's opinion considers only the Gulf transaction, it was not the only
defensive tactic undertaken by Goodrich. The Goodrich defense included litigation claiming
violation by Northwest of the federal securities laws, political pressure, an additional defensive acquisition designed to create an antitrust barrier, and the proposal of shark repellent

amendments. See
(1970).

0. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINEss BEHAVIOR
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While the price paid for the joint venture could be reviewed in
traditional fairness terms,3 9 the court also had to deal with the claim
that the transaction should not have taken place at any price. And
this inquiry was particularly difficult because the court had to acknowledge that it was the Northwest tender offer which triggered the
transaction.4 ° Nonetheless, the court avoided reviewing the "fairness" of Goodrich's resistance by analyzing motive instead. While
acknowledging that one of Goodrich's motives was to defeat the offer,
the court expressly rejected the contention that "'where a board of
directors has as one of its motives manipulation for control the transaction is invalid, regardless of fairness, and regardless of whether a
legitimate corporate purpose is also being served.' "4 Only if "Goodrich officials' desire to remain in office was the sole or the primary
motive for their decisions" 42 would resistance breach the duty of loyalty. Where dual motives are present-maintaining control and furthering a legitimate corporate interest-the conflict of interest is
eliminated and the appropriate standard, as in Chef, is the business
judgment rule: "Goodrich's officers and directors appear to have
been exercising'43their honest business judgment, so that their decision
is conclusive."

Despite the doctrinal ingenuity by which the policy conflict/primary purpose test avoids the impossible task of substantive
judicial review of the merits of conflicting claimants for corporate
control, the central problem still remains: Blocking a change in control may reflect management's self-interest regardless of policy differences with a rival for control, and regardless of whether the defensive
tactic chosen also serves an unrelated corporate purpose. This approach converts the issue from one of duty of loyalty to one of duty of
care, with the consequent "incongruity of applying a standard
designed to vindicate the exercise of business judgment in non-conflict-of-interest situations as a measure of compliance with the duty of
39. 301 F. Supp. at 710. Among Northwest's claims was an assertion that the price paid
by Goodrich for the Gulf'joint venture interest was too high.
40. Id. at 712 ("Northwest's tender offer announcement galvanized Goodrich and Gulf
to complete the purchase at this time.").
41. Id. (quoting Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 21, 204
A.2d 795, 805 (1964)).
42. Id.
43. Id. Recent cases have consistently followed this standard. See, e.g., Treadway Cos.
Inc. v. Care Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,603, 98,210-11 (2d
Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (Ist Cir. 1977); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
486 F. Supp. 1168, 1186 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afd, Nos. 80-1375, 80-1389 (7th Cir. April 2, 1981);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
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loyalty, which arises only in conflict-of-interest situations."' So long
as the policy conflict/primary purpose test is applied, management's
conflict of interest cannot be and, I have argued, was not intended to
be, confronted.
The courts were led to this impasse because they concentrated
narrowly on the appropriateness of management conduct in the case
at hand, an inquiry which, unless limited, would necessarily involve
the court in an exercise resembling fundamental security analysis,
rather than approaching the problem through a broader examination of the appropriate allocation of responsibility between management and shareholders with respect to change in control. This
approach requires an understanding of the structure of the modern,
publicly held corporation, including particularly the role of nonstatutory elements like economic markets. The next part develops this
structure and, from it, a general principle governing the role of management in opposing a change in corporate control.
II.

A

STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO TENDER OFFER DEFENSES

Whatever the attraction of reasoning based on extrastatutory relationships and interactions in other areas of the law, it might have
been expected to dominate in corporation law, whose doctrinal core
can be explained only on a structural rather than a textual basis.
This point, and what I mean by a structural approach, can be clarified by considering how that doctrinal core developed.
"American corporate statutes. . are 'inno sense a code of company law. . . .' "" Typical statutes provide only a skeletal arrangement of the various parts of the corporate entity. As a result,
extrastatutory principles early developed which fleshed out the skeleton by defining the function of, and relationship among, the statutory elements. Perhaps the best example of the addition of
extrastatutory flesh to statutory bone is the fiduciary duty doctrine
itself. Although the typical corporation statute vests management
with the power to direct the corporation's business,4 6 management's
44. Brudney, supra note 32, at 274. In Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir.
1980), Chief Judge Seitz recognized this incongruity but asserted, without citation of authority, that the result was intentional: "The business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem [unavoidable conflict of interests] by validating certain situations that otherwise would
involve a conflict of interest for the ordinary fiduciary." Embracing the effect of the subterfuge as intended, however, is only another, less inventive, means of avoidance.
45. M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 86 (quoting, in part, L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES
OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 8 (2d ed. 1957)).
46. Eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1975 &
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obligations to the corporation and shareholders were not historically
the subject of statutory explication. While specific duties and liabilities were outlined with respect to particular obligations like dividend
payments,4 7 there was typically no mention of a more general duty of
care or loyalty. Nor is legislative silence solely an historical phenomenon. The corporation laws of some 30 states, including Delaware,
still do not contain a standard of director conduct, and of those
which now do contain such a standard, many were enacted only following the addition of section 35-a statutory specification of director obligation-to the Model Business Corporation Act in 1975.48
But legislative silence did not prevent standards from developing;
it was merely left to the courts to develop the concepts of fidelity and
care which have defined the obligations of corporate management.4 9
And the sources to which the courts turned implicitly acknowledged
the centrality of issues of structure and relationship. Recognizing
that corporate statutes created an entity in which management of
individuals' property was placed in the hands of representatives, the
courts established the character of management responsibility by referring to that relationship. Since the relationship was representative, the courts took from trust and agency law the concept of
fiduciary duty."
Moreover, the steady divergence of corporate "fiduciary" law
from its trust law ancestor reflected changes not in the corporate statute, but in the character of the parties to the relationship and in the
economic environment in which the corporation functioned 5 1 Indeed, the fiduciary obligation evolved despite the statute. It is now
Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1980-81); ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 35, at 253 (Supp. 1977) (as revised in 1974).
47. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 316 (West Supp. 1980) (directors' liability for distributions, loans, and guarantees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (1975) (liability of directors for
unlawful payment of dividend or unlawful stock purchase or redemption); ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d § 48 (Supp. 1977) (liability of directors in certain cases).
48. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d § 35, at 270 (Supp. 1977); see Report of
the Committee on CorporateLaws.- Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct, 30 Bus. LAW. 501
(1975). The controversy over codification of the standard of director obligation continues.
Compare Veasey & Manning, CodtadStandard--SafeHarboror UnchartedReef? An Analsis ofthe
Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 921 (1980), with
Arsht & Hinsey, Codieftd Standard--SameHarborbut ChartedChanneL A Response, 35 Bus. LAW.
947 (1980).
49. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 34-35 (1976); J. HURST, THE LEGrrIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at
98 (1970); Latty, Why Are Business CorporationLaws Largey "Enabling"?,50 CORNELL L.Q. 599,
606 (1965).
50. See note 17 supra.
51. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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commonplace that corporate actions which satisfy the terms of the
statute in all respects may be set aside if they conflict with a nonstatutory obligation derived from the structure of the statute. Singer v.
Magnavox Co.5 2 and its progeny,5 3 in which the fiduciary obligation

was held to override strict compliance with the statutory requirements for mergers, are only the most recent examples. 4
The skeleton of the corporation is created by statute, but the
functioning of the complete entity is not statutorily defined. Guidance comes from the structure itself, from the relationships and interactions-some statutory, others not-which determine corporate
behavior. This Part describes the broader structure of the corporation and, on that basis, demonstrates that management's power to
oppose tender offers should be severely limited.
A.

The Structure of the Corporation and the Theory of the Firm

All corporate statutes define the corporate skeleton in essentially
identical terms. Owners of freely transferable voting securities elect a
board of directors which, in turn, selects executive officers who, with
the help of lesser employees, manage the business of the corporation. 5 The remainder of the corporate structure and the behavioral
characteristics exhibited by the various participants depend heavily
on matters not the subject of statutory concern. For the publicly
held corporation, the markets in which the corporation participates-product, managerial, and capital-are the central determinants of that structure and behavior. To understand the role these
markets play in the structure of public corporations, we must begin
at what was the beginning of modern corporate analysis-the separation of ownership and management.
52. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
53. E.g., Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) (although reported in an earlier volume of
the Atlantic Reporter, Tanzer was decided after Singer); cf. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285
A.2d 437 (Del. 197 1) (fiduciary duty prevents advancing date of annual meeting despite compliance with relevant statutory requirements). See general'y Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YAE LEJ. 1345 (1978); Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A
ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976).
54. See A. CONARD, supra note 49, at 33-34; M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 86-94.
55. The text, while accurately describing the central role of executive officers with respect to actual management of the corporation, is an inaccurate description of the process by
which directors and executive officers are selected. In most publicly traded corporations, the
board of directors is selected by senior management rather than, as the statute contemplates,
selection of senior management by the board. This phenomenon, and the literature dealing
with it, are thoroughly reviewed in M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 139-70.
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That the identity of the nominal owners of a public corporation-the shareholders-and those managing it diverged resulted inevitably from industry's capital needs in an expanding economy.
The founder of a business, lacking the personal resources to exploit
available opportunities, turned to outside sources of capital to
finance expansion. As capital flowed into the corporation from nonmanagement sources, so did overall ownership of the corporation
flow to the providers of capital. As Berle and Means stressed in their
classic work, "[i]t is precisely this separation of control from ownership which makes possible tremendous aggregations of property. "56
As the number of shareholders increased, separating the management function from the function of providing capital also became
affirmatively desirable. Active managerial participation by shareholders faces enormous barriers. First, acquiring the information
necessary to participate in corporate management is costly. Even if
the corporation, as the least costly producer, distributed such information, the shareholder time necessary to understand and evaluate
the information is still significant. Second, the cost of coordinating
shareholder participation--of creating mechanisms to determine
what decision the shareholder owners had made-is also great .5 Finally, successful management of a large corporation requires specialized skills which individual shareholders are unlikely to possess. It is
therefore beneficial for those having capital but lacking managerial
expertise to hire those with expertise at managing capital but lacking
the capital to manage." As Professor Clark has recently commented,
"the assertion of any individual shareholder that he knows better
than the managers how to run the company borders on hubris."5 9
The advantages of centralized, specialized management, however, are not without cost. Management monitors the performance
56.

A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5

(1932); see Manne, supra note 9, at 261. My description of shareholders as the "owners" of the
corporation does not suggest that the role described for them in the following pages flows,
normatively, from their "ownership." It derives, rather, from the need for those holding the
residual interest in corporate profits to have the means to displace management which performs poorly. As will be apparent, this position is based on matters other than a preconception of the rights associated with "ownership"; indeed, if the statute did not provide for
shareholders we would have to invent them.
57. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); R.
POSNER, supra note 16, at 303; Anderson, supra note 16, at 778-79; Clark, Vote Bu)ying and
CorporateLaw, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 776, 788 (1979); Heymann, The Prohlem of Coordination: Bargainingand Rules, 86 HARV. L. REv. 797, 831-33 (1973).
58. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 775-76.
59. Clark, supra note 57, at 788-89.
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of components of the enterprise in order to achieve efficient production." But a mechanism is necessary to ensure that management
carries out its monitoring function efficiently; the performance of
management must also be monitored, and hiring yet another team of
monitors merely recreates the problem one level removed. 1 What
succeeds in short-circuiting the process is a reward system that allows
the monitor to retain the benefits of the successful discharge of its
function; self-interest is substituted for supervision to encourage efficient monitoring.62 This describes, of course, the close corporation,
where the owners-the residual claimants who benefit from the increased profits resulting from efficient production-are also the management. In the public corporation, however, ownership and
management are separated, and "the cost of. . .production is increased because the residual claim is not held entirely by the central
monitor."63
60. Alchian & Demsetz, Prodtution, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777, 782 (1972).
61. Alchian and Demsetz ask: "But who will monitor the monitor?" Id. at 782. The
best description of the problem I have discovered is that in T. GEISSEL (DR. SEUSS), DID I
EVER TELL You How LUCKY You ARE? 26-29 (1973) (emphasis in the original):
"Oh, the jobs people work at!
Out west, near Hawtch-Hawtch,
there's a Hawtch-Hawtcher Bee-Watcher.
His job is to watch...
is to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee.
A bee that is watched will work harder, you see.
Well. .. he watched and he watched.
But, in spite of his watch,
that bee didn't work any harder. Not mawtch.
So then somebody said,
"Our old bee-watching man
just isn't bee-watching as hard as he can.
He ought to be watched by another Hawtch-Hawtcher.
The thing that we need
is a Bee-Watcher-Watcher."
WELL...
The Bee-Watcher-Watcher watched the Bee-Watcher.
He didn't watch well. So another Hawtch-Hawtcher
had to come in as a Watch-Watcher-Watcher.
And today all the Hawtchers who live in Hawtch-Hawtch
are watching on Watch-Watcher-Watchering-Watch,
Watch-Watching the Watcher who's watching that bee.
You're not a Hawtch-Hawtcher. You're lucky, you see."
I am grateful to Catherine Hillary Gilson and Rebecca Ann Gilson for calling this source to
my attention. To be fair, Dr. Seuss does ignore the likelihood that some monitoring will be at
least partially effective. See note 72 infia.
62. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 60, at 783.
63. Id. at 786.
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The costs resulting from delegating the monitoring responsibility
to professional management have been more precisely developed by
Jensen and Meckling.64 Management acts as agents of the shareholders. They can be expected, if otherwise unconstrained, to maximize their own welfare rather than the shareholders'. As a result, it is
in the owners' interests to incur "monitoring" costs: expenditures
like third-party audits, designed to make it more difficult for management to prefer itself at the expense of the shareholders. But even
third-party monitoring cannot be fully effective, 65 and it will also be
in the owners' interests to provide profit-sharing incentives designed
to reduce the divergence of interests between management and shareholders.6 6
The sum of these costs--of efforts to prevent management from
favoring itself and to positively motivate management to operate in
the shareholders' interests-together with the loss in potential value
of the enterprise resulting from the inability to entirely prevent divergence of management and shareholder interest, "are the costs of 'separation of ownership and control'" in the public corporation.
B.

Constraints on Management Discretion

Understanding the roles of management and shareholders in the
structure of the modern public corporation thus requires considering
when and how that structure dissuades management from acting
other than in the shareholders' best interest. For my purpose, the
opportunities for management to favor itself at the expense of share64. Jensen & Meckling, Theo7 of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
65. The more specialized the management function becomes, the more difficult the
problem becomes. "The more complicated the service or the product, the more difficult and
costly it is to detect cheating, and the more likely it is that cheating will occur." Anderson,
supra note 16, at 740. Moreover, securing the benefits of specialization requires that the provider of the service be given the discretion to use its expertise. Since the effect of monitoring is
to reduce the discretion accorded the specialist, it also reduces the amount of benefits arising
from the specialist's services. Id. at 744.
66. Incentive plans are also never fully effective. It is difficult to design a plan which
measures only the performance of a single manager undiluted by the efforts of others. Moreover, once the performance measures are specified, strategic behavior is possible which
manipulates the system in a fashion which favors participants without achieving the productivity gains intended. See, e.g., Rappaport, Executive Incentives vs. CorporateGrowth, HARv. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1978, at 81; Some Middle Managers Cut Corners to Achieve High Corporate &oals,
Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 6. These problems are attracting increasing popular
attention. See Meadows, New TargetingforExecutive Pay, FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 176.
67. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 327; see Fama,Agenc Problems and the Theory of
the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980).
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holders fall into two broad categories. First, management may be
inefficient-if the managers worked harder, or were more careful, or
were smarter, the shareholders' return might increase. This inefficiency affects shareholders by reducing production and therefore the
amount of the corporation's income. Second, management may appropriate part of the corporation's income stream. For example,
management may engage in transactions with the corporation which
are unfair to the corporation, may provide itself luxurious office facilities or other perquisites, or in some other fashion may retain for itself
more than a competitive return for managerial services.68 These two
forms of managerial discretion are limited by several mechanisms,
important aspects of which are market rather than legal.
Management's self-interest should constrain significant deviation
from efficient operation.6 9 The viability of the corporation, critical
to both the shareholders' investment and management's continued
employment, depends on the corporation's success in the market for
the good or service it provides. Competition in the product market
will penalize a company with inefficient management.7 ° Ultimately,
the corporation will fail, so that management lose their jobs and the
shareholders lose their capital. 7 1 The market for managerial talent
68. This distinction is drawn in R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 302. Anderson, supra note
16, at 776 n. I 11, has criticized the characterization of laziness as inefficiency because laziness
may also be a form of consumption and thus is better characterized as diversion of corporate
income. While Anderson's criticism has merit, the distinction is analytically helpful and its
partial inaccuracy does not change the substance of the argument.
69. The problem of inefficient production--of "shirking"-exists for all levels of supervisors, not merely senior management. But one would expect the self-interest of lower level
managers to aid more senior management in policing this conduct. Lower level supervisors,
interested in their own advancement, have an incentive to be sure that their supervisors are
made aware of their successes and the failures of their competitors for promotion, thus reducing the cost of securing information. Fama, supra note 67, at 293. Lower level managers also
monitor the performance of their supervisors: "Lower managers perceive that they can gain
by stepping over shirking or less competent managers above them. Moreover, in the team or
nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is concerned with the performance of managers above and below him since his marginal product is likely to be a positive function of
theirs." Id.
70. For my purpose, the controversy over whether the product market acts as a constraint on management discretion in oligopolistic or monopolistic industries need not be resolved. CompareJensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 329-30 and R. WINTER, supra note 16, at
20-21, with Williamson, CorporateControland the Theogy of the Firm, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND
THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 281, 294-95 (H. Manne ed. 1969). I wish to
establish only that the product market operates as some constraint, not that it completely
eliminates discretion.
71. E.g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 302; R. WINTER, sura note 16, at 18. Indeed, the
cost of failure may be far greater for management than for the stockholders. The latter, it will
be recalled, are presumed to hold a diversified portfolio of securities, the value of which
should not be significantly affected by events--like business failure due to the inefficiency of
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also provides incentives for management efficiency. The corporation's performance is commonly treated as a measure of a manager's
skills, and hence is a central ,determinant of the future value of the
manager's services.7 2 Finally, managerial inefficiency is constrained
by the capital market. A corporation's poor performance in its product market is reflected in the market price of the corporation's stock.
Where poor performance is due to management inefficiency, the potential for gain exists through purchasing the corporation's shares at
73
the depressed price and then installing efficient management.
management-affecting only a particular firm. Nontechnical discussions of portfolio theory
are contained in V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE
FINANCE 1143-76 (2d ed. 1979) and in J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 14, at 171-97.
A more detailed, but still accessible presentation is contained in W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS
70-93 (1978). In contrast, the manager has invested his human capital in the firm through
his employment decision, an investment which cannot easily be diversified. But cf. Note, The
Confict Between Managersand Shareholdersin DiversifiingAcquisitions. A Poriio Theogr Approach,
88 YALE LJ. 1238, 1241-44 (1979) (arguing that one motivation for conglomerate mergers is
management's desire to diversify their employment "investment").
72. The role of the managerial market as a mechanism for constraining managerial
discretion to deviate from profit maximization is considered in detail in Fama, supra note 67.
See also R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 302; Werner, supra note 16, at 403. As developed by
Professor Fama, this mechanism operates both within the firm, powered by the ambition of
lower managers, Fama, supra note 67, at 293, and through external forces such as the price of
the corporation's stock as a measure of managerial talent, id. at 292. Ultimately, however, the
extent of the constraint on top management depends on the extent to which top management
can be policed. So long as these managers control their own tenure, the constraint imposed
by a potential reduction in the market value of their services if they were forced to change
jobs is reduced: "Having gained control of the board, top management may decide that
collusion and expropriation of security holder wealth are better than competition among
themselves." Id. at 293. Independent directors might serve to limit the extent of such collusion: "In a state of advanced evolution of the external markets that buttress the corporate
firm, the outside directors are in their turn disciplined by the market for their services which
prices them according to their performance as referees." Id. at 294. And, one must acknowledge, displacement of top management by independent boards of directors does seem to be
occurring with increasing frequency. See Bauer, Why Big Business is Firing the Boss, N.Y.
Times, March 8, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 22. But the question remains as to what force
prevents "collusion and expropriation" from circumventing market discipline on the outside
directors. Fama falls back on the role of the capital markets as a mechanism which will allow
the forcible displacement of unfaithful managers, something which the market for managers,
even as he formulates it, will not accomplish. Fama, supra note 67, at 294-95.
73. I will have more to say about the market for corporate control in notes 84-98 in.fra
and accompanying text. The impact of capital market constraints is also felt through the
product market. To the extent that the corporation's performance is reduced through inefficiency, providers of capital will require a greater return before making their capital available
to the corporation. See, e.g., R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 18-28. This should result, for
example, in higher borrowing costs for less efficient corporations, which should put them at a
disadvantage in the product market compared to companies with more efficient management
and lower capital costs.
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Thus, inefficiency may be policed before it results in business failure
even if management ignores earlier signals.
Where incentive mechanisms created by one part of the corporate
structure-the various markets in which the corporation and its
managers function-constrain managerial discretion to perform inefficiently, one would not expect a different part of that structure to
provide redundant controls. 74 As we have seen, the legal elements of
the corporate structure are consistent with this conclusion. The typical corporate statute assigns management responsibility to the board
of directors. The business judgment rule measures the discharge of
that responsibility. The rule operates to bar courts from providing
additional, and unnecessary, constraints on management discretion
through judicial review of operating decisions.7 5
The role of low-cost market mechanisms in restraining managerial discretion is more limited with respect to management's incentive
to allocate to itself an excessive portion of the corporation's income.
Incentives to succeed in the product market are less likely to constrain managerial self-dealing, since what is of concern is management's ability to allocate to itself income generated through successfl
operation of the corporation's business. Nor will the capital market
provide a substantial constraint. Although a lower rate of return to
shareholders may increase the corporation's cost of new equity capital by decreasing the value of the corporation's shares, this constraint
operates only to the extent the corporation cannot finance its activities through retained earnings and debt.76 In any event, the cost is
borne by existing shareholders through dilution of their interests.7 7
The managerial services market is also less likely to constrain selfdealing than to constrain inefficiency. The buyers of managers for
public corporations are, realistically, other managers. 78 There is no
74. This is not to argue, however, that these markets eliminate managerial inefficiency.
My point is merely that the costs of mechanisms designed to further reduce the incidence of
inefficiency would likely exceed the gains from the reduction. See Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 64, at 326-28.
75. See notes 6-16 supra and accompanying text.
76. Unless lenders believe that management's diversion of part of the corporate income
stream increases the risk of business failure-a non-obvious proposition since management
has extra reason to keep alive the golden goose-the diversion should not affect the cost of
debt.
77. R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 302; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 312-13.
78. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 162-69; M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH
AND REALITY 65-68, 71 (1971); Mace, Directors: M1'h and Realio--Ten Years Later, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979).
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reason to believe that an efficient manager's penchant for high pay or
perquisites will be negatively viewed.
Thus, except for the potential constraint imposed by the market
for corporate control, the market component of the corporate structure is not likely to impose substantial limits on management's ability
to self-deal. In contrast to its function with respect to managerial
inefficiency, the legal component of the corporate structure has a significant role in constraining management's self-dealing.
79
Consistent with this conclusion, the courts (and some statutes)
require that management demonstrate the fairness of its dealings
with the corporation.8 ° But while a judicially enforced fairness standard may reduce management discretion to self-deal in many settings, there are important situations where the potential for
management's favoring itself at the expense of shareholders cannot
be limited by reference to fairness.8 ' For example, where corporate
income is diverted to acquiring new businesses rather than being distributed to the shareholders, the question of fairness, as measured by
the price paid for the business, is beside the point. Judicially determining whether a particular acquisition was "fair," or whether the
funds should instead have been returned to the shareholders by way
of dividends, is impossible.8 2 And as I have argued, the same problem exists when management's self-dealing takes the form of resisting
changes in corporate control.8
Thus far, the structure of the corporation-market constraints
and a judicially enforced fiduciary duty-does not effectively limit
management's ability to self-deal by protecting its control position.
The market for corporate control is the remaining potential source of
constraint. Considering the fit of this market in the corporate structure leads back to the role of tender offers and the bearing of corporate structure on the appropriateness of management opposition.
79. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
80. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
81. What goals managers pursue when given the discretion has been the subject of a
substantial literature, which has recently been surveyed in Marris & Mueller, The Corporation,
Competition, and the Invisible Hand, 18 J. ECON. Lrr. 32 (1980). For an early review, see Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Alargiralist,Behavioral,Managerial, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 1 (1967). For
my purpose, the existence of the discretion, rather than its use, is of principal interest.
82. See Brudney, Dividends, Discretion,and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85, 103-08 (1980).
83. See notes 21-44 supra and accompanying text.
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The Marketfor Corporate Control

Owing to the groundbreaking work of Henry Manne,8 4 it is now
commonly acknowledged that the market for corporate control is an
important mechanism by which management's discretion to favor itself at the expense of shareholders may be constrained.8 5 Indeed,
where that favoritism is expressed in subtle ways, the market for corporate control may be the only potentially serious force for limiting
management discretion. Thus, the fit of this constraint within the
legal and market structure of the corporation is of central importance.
The theory of a corporate control market posits that a decrease in
corporate profits, whether because of inefficient management or because efficient but self-dealing management has diverted too much
income to itself, causes the price of the corporation's stock to decline
to a level consistent with the corporation's reduced profitability.
This creates an opportunity for entrepreneurial profit. If shares representing control can be purchased at a price which, together with
the associated transaction costs, 8' is less than the shares' value follow84. Manne, Marketfor Corporate Control, supra note 23; see Manne, Cash Tender Orsfor
Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE LJ. 231; Manne, supra note 9; Manne, Share
Voting, supra note 23; Manne, supra note 12.
85. Eg., M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 66-68; R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 303-05;
R. WINTER, supra note 16, at 18-28; Fama, supra note 67, at 295; Hindley, Separation of Ownership and Control in the Modem Corporation, 13 J.L. & ECON. 185 (1970); Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 64, at 294-95; Werner, supra note 16, at 403-44. Even Oliver Williamson, perhaps the
most persistent critic of the significance of control market constraints on managerial discretion, concedes that some constraint is forthcoming: "[T]he question that needs to be addressed is whether . . . competition in the capital market can be reliably regarded as a
substitute means of enforcing neoclassical profit maximizing behavior. Note that the issue is
not whether competition in the capital market has a 'tendency' to promote behavior along
profit maximizing lines; no one appears to deny the existence of such effects. The essential
question is the matter of degree." Williamson, supra note 70, at 296.
86. Transaction costs in takeovers can take a variety of forms: 1) information-search
costs incurred by the acquiring corporation in order to identify an attractive target. See, e.g.,
Grossman & Hart, Takeover Bids, The FreeRider Problem, and the Theo' of the Corporation, 11 BELL
J. ECON. 42, 57-58 (1980); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federaland State Regulations
of Cash Tender Ofers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980); 2) administrative-makingeven an uncontested tender offer requires such elements as an information agent, forwarding agents, and
depositories. See, e.g., 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 11-12; 3) regulatogeven an uncontested tender offer poses the expense of compliance with the filing, waiting
period, or other requirements of one or more regulatory systems. First, the filing and disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1976), must be satisfied. See,
e.g., 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 173-22 1. Second, if the acquisition is
of sufficient size, the filing and waiting period requirements of Title II, "Premerger Notification," of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976),
must be met. See generaloy S. AXINN, B. FOGG & N. STOLL, AcQuIsITIONS UNDER THE HARTScorr-RODINo ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS AcT (1979). Third, the transaction may fall
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ing displacement of existing management, then everyone-other
than the management to be displaced-benefits from the transaction. Selling shareholders receive more for their stock than its value
under previous management; new management receives an entrepreneurial reward through the increased value of acquired shares;
and society benefits from more efficiently used resources.
Two important conditions are necessary for this happy concurrence of results. First, the market price of the corporation's stock
must accurately reflect incumbent management's inefficiency or
greed. Second, there must be mechanisms available for displacing
incumbent management. While little debate remains concerning satisfaction of the stock market condition,8 8 major difficulties remain
concerning the availability of displacement mechanisms.
Four general mechanisms for displacing incumbent management
are possible under modern corporate statutes: a merger, a sale of
substantially all of the corporation's assets, a proxy fight, and a
tender offer. The availability of each in the face of resistance by inwithin the requirements of one of the 34 state tender offer laws. The variety of approaches
reflected in these statutes is surveyed in Bartells, State Takeover Statutes: A Surv,, in 1 NINTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 341 (1977). The constitutionality of state
efforts to regulate tender offers is doubtful, and the three courts of appeals which have faced
the issue found the state statute before them unconstitutional. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 97,731 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey); Mite
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980),prob.juris notedsub nom. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 49
U.S.L.W. 3824 (1981) (Illinois); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)
(Utah). Finally, if the target is also subject to regulation by such agencies as the Interstate
Commerce Commission, Federal Communications Commission, or Federal Maritime Commission, a change in control may require prior administrative approval in order to avoid loss
of licenses or permits. See, e.g., A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 24-11 to -27; 4) defensivetarget management opposition may also impose substantial costs. For example, the general
counsel of Mead Corp. predicted that the fees of only the principal law firm in its successful
resistance of an Occidental Petroleum exchange offer could be as much as three million dollars. The Flom Firm Takes Over as Top Mongy Maker in '78, Am. Law., Feb. 1979, at 1, col. 1, and
at 13, col. 2. It was reported that the costs of that contest to both sides totalled some $15
million, and that the total fees, for lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, proxy solicitors,
and public relations professionals, incurred by the three parties in the battle between McDermott, Inc. and Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc. for Pullman, Inc. were some $17 million. OutsideProfessionals Play an Increasing Role in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
A recent empirical study has estimated that transaction costs may amount to at least 13%
of the post-offer market price of the target's shares. Smiley, Tender OFers, TransactionsCosts and
the Theo.y of the Finn, 22 REv. ECON. & STAT. 22 (1976); accord, 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note
38, at 100 (estimate of 10-25%).
87. See notes 84-85 supra.
88. See note 14 sura.
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cumbent management differs substantially,8 9 a fact crucial to the operation of the market for corporate control since, in that market,
resistance exists by definition.
Under most corporation statutes, merger or sale of assets is impossible without incumbent management's cooperation. Both methods
require shareholder approval, but shareholders cannot consider the
proposal unless the board of directors first approves it.9" If incumbent management opposes the transaction, the shareholders will have
no opportunity to consider it.9"
Corporate law and economics combine to make the proxy fight
an unattractive displacement mechanism. As a practical matter, incumbent management may use corporate resources to resist the challenger's candidacy. 92 The challenger, however, must use its own
funds, which are unlikely to be reimbursed if the challenge fails.93
Moreover, although the proxy contest campaign costs are largely independent of the number of shares owned by the challenger, the
challenger's expected return on its investment seemingly is dependent on share ownership; only shareholders will receive benefits resulting from displacement. Thus, in addition to the free rider
problem,9 4 return on the challenger's investment is likely to be
greater on funds spent to acquire shares (and votes) than on the costs
of the proxy contest itself. This counsels in favor of the remaining
displacement mechanism-the tender offer.
If incumbent management has complete control over mergers
and sales of assets, and if proxy contests are economically unattractive to potential challengers,95 then the tender offer assumes a critical
89. For discussion of the factors other than management resistance bearing on the
choice among acquisition techniques, see, e.g., 1 BUSINESS ACQUIsrrIONS: PLANNING AND
PRACTICE (J. Herz & C. Bailer eds. 1971); B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND
MERGERS §§ 23.01-27.09 (1980); J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND
TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS 75-138 (1975).

90. Set, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101 (merger), 1001 (sale of assets) (West 1977 &
Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets) (1975 & Supp. 1980);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 902 (merger), 909 (sale of assets) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1980-81); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D §§ 71 (merger), 79 (sale of assets)
(1971).

91. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 788-89; Dodd, MergerfProposa, Management Discretion
andStockholder Wealth, 8J. FIN. EcON. 105, 105-06 (1980); Manne,Share Voting,supra note 23,

at 1437-38.
92. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955); see note 32 supra. See generally E. ARANOw & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 541-68 (2d ed. 1968); M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 121-27.
93.

E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 92, at 569-8 1.

94. See Clark, supra note 57, at 783-84.
95. Casual evidence supports the conclusion that a proxy contest is an uneconomic
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role in the corporate structure. The market for corporate control is
the principal constraint on management self-dealing in important situations, and the tender offer is the only displacement mechanism
which has the potential to effectuate that constraint. Further, the
market for corporate control, effectuated by tender offers, is also an
important pre-bankruptcy constraint on management inefficiency.
To the extent that the business judgment rule presupposes effective
nonlegal constraints on management decisions, 9 6 it is inconsistent

with management control over tender offers.
If management can adopt defensive tactics which prevent shareholder decisions to accept a tender offer, the results are predictable.
An offer will be made only if the perceived value of the corporation
following displacement of incumbent management exceeds the share
method of displacing management. Despite extensive shareholder litigation, the manage1980),
ments of Marshall Field, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill.
afd, Nos. 80-1375, 80-1389 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 1981), Gerber Products, Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978), and McGraw-Hill, Lewis v. McGraw, 619
F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 101 S. Ct. 354 (1980), are still in place. No proxy contests
have been launched to displace them. This apparent shareholder preference for class action
litigation over proxy contests seems quite sensible. In contrast to the free rider problem inherent in the proxy fight, the availability of the contingent fee in class action litigation eliminates
the need for an individual shareholder to advance the funds for the contest, and compensation of the lawyer from a common fund eliminates the free rider problem. In granting fee
awards to class action plaintiffs' lawyers, courts expressly consider the "riskiness" of the case
as a factor in determining the size of the award. See, e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $196,921, at 95,862 (D. Del. 1979) (citations omitted):
"After careful consideration, this court also finds that the [fee determined by multiplying
hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate] must be substantially increased, first because of the
contingent nature of success. In pursuing the development of this case, plaintiffs and their
attorneys carried a heavy burden and assumed a significant risk. Since no governmental
investigation or other court action preceded this case, it was begun and pursued without
substantial assurance as to what the evidence might prove. Despite this uncertainty, plaintiffs' attorneys undertook substantial discovery . . . .While these investigations apparently
yielded helpful evidence, the results could have been otherwise; plaintiffs might have been
forced to abandon this case, leaving their attorneys without compensation.
"... [P]laintiffs' attorneys also assumed the risk of adverse developments in the unsettled law of securities regulation. . . .Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys undertook a substantial risk
of adverse legal rulings.

.. ."

Indeed, a plaintiffs' lawyer functions to some extent as a risk arbitrageur. The lawyer
will expend funds on the lawsuit as long as there is sufficient likelihood of liability that potential fees (which take risk into account), discounted by time and the potential of nonliability,
exceed the lawyer's opportunity cost. See Clark, supra note 57, at 785-87.
Proxy contests cannot be dismissed entirely, however. They do in fact occur, and management does occasionally lose. The occasional occurrence of a proxy fight may be accounted
for by the lower capital cost of the transaction. While a tender offer presents a more attractive investment, it is available only if the additional funds necessary to purchase the shares
can be obtained.
96. See texts accompanying notes 14-16, 73-74 supra.
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price offered plus the transaction costs associated with acquiring the
shares.97 If incumbent management can increase the transaction
costs associated with a tender offer, the incentive to make that offer
and the constraint imposed by the potential that an offer will be
made are decreased, and incumbent management's discretion correspondingly increased.9 8 Thus, the corporate structure requires that
tender offerors have unrestricted access to target shareholders.
D. The GeneralPrinca'le: Shareholders Must Make the Decision
The argument thus far presented is that other elements of the
structure of the corporation, having statutory, judicial and market
components, serve to constrain the managerial discretion unavoidably resulting from the modern corporation's need for specialized
managerial skills and capital. The tender offer is the critical mechanism through which the corporate structure imposes constraints on
certain forms of managerial self-dealing. It is in this context that a
structural approach to corporate law considers the validity of defensive tactics.
The result of management adopting successful defensive tactics is
to make impossible a tender offer which management has not
blessed. For example, the postoffer acquisition by the target of a
business which creates an antitrust barrier to the offer 99 causes access
to shareholders through a tender offer to be conditioned in the same
manner that the corporate statute conditions access to shareholders
in a merger or sale of assets. Absent approval of incumbent management, a tender offer, like a merger or sale of assets, is impossible.
This result, however, is flatly inconsistent with the structure of
the corporation. The market for corporate control is crucial to the
corporate structure because neither other markets nor a fiduciary
"fairness" standard effectively constrains some forms of management
self-dealing. Moreover, the control market allows a final constraint
on management inefficiency short of business failure. In turn, the
97. See note 86 supra.
98. For example, suppose an offeror believes that a potential target would be worth $50
per share if the offeror could secure control. If the transaction costs associated with securing
control were $5 per share, the offer would be worthwhile at any price below $45 per share. If
transaction costs increased to $15 per share because of target management action, then the
market value of the shares would have to drop below $35 per share before the offer would be
worthwhile to the offeror. Management's discretion to favor itself or manage inefficiently
would increase by an amount with a capitalized value of $10 per share. See Smiley, supra note

86, at 24-25.
99. The extensive use of this tactic by Marshall Field & Co. is chronicled in Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., Nos. 80-1375, 80-1389, slip op. at 3-5, 8-9 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 1981).
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tender offer is crucial because no other displacement mechanism is
available without management cooperation. If management can use
defensive tactics to obtain a degree of control over tender offers similar to that given it over mergers and sales of assets, then the corporate
structure is fundamentally altered in a fashion which allows management effective monopoly power over corporate control. Rather than
displacement occurring when the gains from displacement (the benefits of synergy or the elimination of inefficiency or self-dealing) exceed the price to be paid (including transaction costs), transfer of
control will occur only when the benefits to incumbent management
from the transaction exceed the capitalized value to management of
its existing discretion. In short, defensive tactics, if successful, circumvent the mechanism by which the corporate structure constrains
managerial discretion and, therefore, are improper.
The structural argument establishing the invalidity of defensive
tactics, generally based on the interplay between statute, courts, and
markets, is perfectly consistent with a construction of the statutory
terms dealing directly with displacement mechanisms. Not surprisingly, this construction is based on analysis of the relationships created by the statute itself; coming full circle, this is precisely the form
of argument by which the courts initially developed the fiduciary
duty concept.' 0 0
Corporate statutes properly place the ultimate responsibility for
evaluating proposals for merger or sale of assets with management.
These complicated transactions require substantial time investments
for shareholders to understand them."° Assuming loyal management, a rational shareholder would not invest time considering a
merger or sale of assets unless management, through application of
100. See notes 45-54 supra and accompanying text.
I01. Where the transaction involves the issuance of the offeror's securities, the offer
must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933 unless an exemption from registration is available. Seegeneral' R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 464-95 (4th ed. 1977). Until
recently, such a transaction would be registered on Form S-14, 17 C.F.R. § 239.23 *(1980),
which has been described as generating "some of the longest and most complex disclosure
documents presented to investors," with an average length of 110 pages, and some exceeding

200 pages.

HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST

SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 440 (Comm. Print
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE]. The SEC has recently

1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
adopted Form S-15, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,647

(1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 239.29), intended to be an abbreviated alternative to
Form S-14, for use in a limited range of acquisition transactions. See genera/y Eppler, Short
Form Registration in Business Combination Transactions-FormS-15, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 87 (1980).
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its specialized skills, had already approved it. The problem is ensuring, within reasonable limits, that management's determination-for
example, to reject an offer-is motivated by the shareholders', rather
than management's, best interests. And it was precisely the difficulty
of making such a determination which forced courts to sidestep the
problem by applying the business judgment rule to management's
fiduciary role in changes of control. 1o2 The solution is the check and
balance of the tender offer. If management, in rejecting merger or
sale of assets proposals, gives priority to its own interests rather than
those of the shareholders, the spurned suitor can make a tender offer
to the shareholders. 103 Should management become too recalcitrant,
an alternative is available.
This system of check and balance, of management control of
some mechaenisms by which control may be shifted but with unfettered access to shareholders -through another, is precisely the structure reflected in the typical corporation statute. While control of the
merger and sale of asset mechanisms is .firmly ensconced in management, the tender offer mechanism generally is not 'even mentioned in
the statute, let alone placed within management's control.'° 4 Thus,
102. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
103. Where management favors itself by accepting an offer-perhaps because of
favorable side payments in the form of employment contracts or stock options-the statute
provides an explicit, if in practice illusory, check through the statutory requirement of shareholder approval. See note 90 supra and accompanying text. The constraint of shareholder
approval, however, is buttressed by the operation of the market for corporate control. Between the public announcement of board of director approval of the transaction and the date
of the shareholder meeting, competing offers-via tender offers--may be made if the transaction negotiated by management was too favorable to the offeror or to management.
104. Where the tender offer is explicitly mentioned, it is in an effort to provide a statutory solution to the de facto merger problem. For example, CAL. CORP. CODE § 181 (West
1977) defines three types of reorganizations, including an "exchange reorganization" which
amounts to an acquisition by means of a tender offer where the consideration is the offeror's
stock. Section 1201 requires a vote of the shareholders of the offeror if, following the transaction, these shareholders will own shares of the offeror representing less than five-sixths of the
voting power. No role at all is created for the target board. See generally Small, Corporate
Combinations Under the New CaliforniaGeneralCorporationLaw, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1190 (1976).
That the statute does not assign management a role in traditional tender offers is underscored by the addition in 1976 of Model Business Corporation Act § 72A. ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 72A (Supp. 1977). This section creates a mechanism by which an
exchange offer can be made binding on target shareholders if both the board of directors and
the shareholders approve the transaction by the same procedures required for mergers and
sales of assets. While management is given a role where the transaction is made binding, the
statute expressly preserves the option of a traditional tender offer, and in that setting no role is
accorded target management. Only a few jurisdictions have followed the Model Act in
adopting such a provision. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1501 (5th ed. 1980).
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to reiterate my basic point from a somewhat different perspective, all
components of the structure of the modern corporation-market, judicial, and statutory-combine to establish a critical role for the
tender offer: as the principal displacement mechanism by which the
capital market may police the performance of management and
thereby justify the central role accorded management in other displacement mechanisms. Defensive tactics, because they alter the allocation of tender offer responsibility between management and
shareholders contemplated by this structure, are inappropriate.
III.

RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS FOR MANAGEMENT DISCRETION
TO BLOCK A TENDER OFFER

There has been no shortage of defenders of a management role
far broader than that assigned by my structural approach. The arguments offered by management's champions all seek to justify allowing management to prevent shareholders, under particular
circumstances, from displacing management by tendering their shares.
The common thread joining the arguments is the unlimited discretion accorded management to identify the circumstances.
A.

FunctionalEquivalence to Other Acquisition Techniques

The most common argument supporting managerial discretion to
block a tender offer asserts that a tender offer is functionally no different from any other acquisition technique.10 5 If management has
effectively complete discretion over whether shareholders will be
given the opportunity to vote on a merger or sale of assets, then it
should have a comparable role with respect to tender offers. Certainly, the argument continues, the mere form chosen for substantively equivalent transactions should not determine management's
06

role. 1

105. See, e.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 21, at 159; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target'sBoardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 104, 116 (1979); Pearlmutter, Shareholdersvs. The Corporation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1980, § 3, at 18, col. 3 (Mr. Pearlmutter is a general partner of
Lazard Freres & Co., a major investment banking firm); Steinbrink, Afanagement7 Response to
The Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. RE v. 882, 892 (19784. When the transaction is
friendly-t., target management has approved the acquisition-a tender offer i& the
equivalent of the alternative acquisition techniques and the choice among them is made on
the basis of criteria other than the need to avoid a management veto.
106. Some commentators have taken the point a good deal further by pointing to the
statutory award of the duty to manage the corporation to the board of directors, and then
arguing that a tender offer presents a policy decision no different from others-like plant
investment-which no one disputes should be made solely by management. E.g., Pearlmutter, supra note 105, at 18, col. 3 ("Is a takeover bid of such a different nature from other
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The argument extrapolates the typical statutory terms dealing
with mergers and asset sales to a form of transaction-the tender offer-rarely mentioned in the typical statute. 107 A nonstructural response is that a technical construction of the statute-contrasting the
pivotal role assigned management with respect to mergers and asset
sales with the absence of any statutory role with respect to tender
offers-favors a more limited tender offer role for management. The
statutory silence regarding tender offers may simply reflect a legislative assumption that free alienation of property is the norm, so that
management's affirmative role in mergers and asset sales needs to be
stated, while its nonrole in tender offers need not. 08 And while functional equivalence advocates argue that the earlier statutes were silent because they were adopted prior to the time when hostile tender
offers became popular acquisition techniques,10 9 even a vigorous proponent of management discretion acknowledges that "continuation
of [the statutory silence] in recently adopted statutes is disquieting."110
One need not, however, limit response to the language of the statute. Under a structural view, functional equivalence among acquisition techniques is important, but this view favors a nonequivalent,
much more limited, role for management in tender offers. The management monopoly of the market for corporate control which would
important business decisions, such as hiring a new chief executive officer or approving a large
capital expenditure program, that the shareholders should decide the issue themselves?"); see
Lipton, supra note 105, at 120.
The broader position proves too much. The basic equivalence argument asserts that a
tender offer is the same as a merger or sale of assets. But in those decisions, the typical
corporation statute clearly gives the shareholders a role different from that given with respect
to other "important" policy decisions: Actions which involve direct sales of the corporation,
like mergers and sales of assets, require shareholder approval, while the supposedly analogous
policy decisions do not. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 213-51; Carney, Fundamental
Corporate Changes,Anorlo Shareholders, andBusiness Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J.
69. Therefore, the analogy between takeover bids and other policy decisions, given the equivalence argument, should also apply to mergers and sales of assets, which is inconsistent with
the structure of the statute.
107. See note 104 spra and accompanying text.
108. See BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 775-77 (rev. ed. 1946); M. EISENBERG, supra
note 28, at 239; McNulty, Corporationsand the IntertemporalConfct ofLaws, 55 CALIF. L. REV.
12 (1967).
109. E.g., Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 889. No authority is offered for the assertion.
Moreover, the corporate statutes which do cover an exchange offer, such as CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 151, 1201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1981) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(R)-(T),
.83(A), .84(D) (Page 1978), either treat the de facto merger problem or create a share exchange mechanism, see note 104 supra, but still do not grant directors an express tender offer
role.
110. Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 890 (citations omitted).
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result from extending management autonomy to tender offers eliminates the discipline imposed on management by that same market.
Restricting management's role in a tender offer does not deny the
value of management's expertise in evaluating and negotiating complex corporate transactions, but rather validates the unfettered discretion given management with respect to mergers and sales of assets.
For this purpose, the crucial distinction is not between different
acquisition techniques, but between negotiated and hostile transactions. In a negotiated transaction, the acquisition terms result from
bargaining between the offeror and target management, and shareholders benefit from management's skill and experience. The problem, however, is that target management may elect not to negotiate,
or not to negotiate in good faith. Management's interest in remaining in office creates a conflict which the traditional standards of care
and loyalty are incapable of policing. In this setting, the tender offer
provides a self-executing check on management's discharge of its responsibility as holder of primary control over the acquisition process.
"If negotiations break down, it is still possible for the acquiring company or someone else to go forward with a tender offer. The existence of this safety valve against the directors' conflict of interest is an
important justification for giving the directors unfettered discretion
in the process of negotiating acquisitions.""'
Moreover, offerors should not prefer to use a tender offer to sidestep target management and thereby deprive target shareholders of
management's guidance and bargaining. The negotiation process
typically involves transferring to the offeror substantial amounts of
nonpublic information concerning the target." 2 This information
111. Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 21, at 158. The use of differential levels of
regulation for substantively similar, indeed competing, activities has been advocated in other
areas. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and PublicAccess: Towarda Theogy ofParialRegulalion of
the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. Ray. 1 (1976) (explanation for differential regulation of public
access to electronic media and print media).
112. While substantial consideration will have been given to the selection of an acquisition candidate prior to the point at which actual negotiations begin, it is commonly recognized that the negotiation process itself generates large amounts of information concerning
the target which is available through no other source. See, e.g., J. FREUND, supra note 89, at
230-31; J. MCGAFFEY, BUYING, SELLING, AND MERGING BUSINESSES 13-32 (1979). Consider, for example, the process of negotiating the representations and warranties contained in
alia, the accuracy
a typical acquisition agreement. The target will be asked to warrant, inter
of financial statements and the absence of significant change since the date of the most recent
audited statement; the absence of any liabilities for taxes or other matters not disclosed in the
agreement including, most importantly, the absence of contingent liabilities; the condition of
Various assets believed to be of importance to the operation of the target's business; the existence of litigation against the target, whether actual or threatened; and the extent to which
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reduces uncertainty about the future return on the acquisition and
hence increases the value of the investment to the offeror.' 1 3 Even
though target management may drive a hard bargain on behalf of
the shareholders, the offeror has an incentive to negotiate, because
resort to a hostile tender offer eliminates access to valuable information."'
various elements of the target's work force are unionized or with respect to which organization efforts are underway. See e.g., B. Fox & E. Fox, sufira note 89, §§ 29.21-.30; J. FREUND,
supra note 89, at 248-83; J. MCGAFFNEY, supra, at 37-41. Freund, a prominent practitioner
in the acquisition area, stresses the information-producing role of such contractual provisions
and the negotiation process generally: "There are no known statistics on the subject, but I'm
willing to bet my briefcase that lawyers spend more time negotiating 'Representations of the
Seller' than any other single article in the typical acquisition agreement ...
"From the purchaser's viewpoint, representations serve at least three distinct, although
overlapping, purposes. First, they are useful as a device to obtain the maximum degree of
disclosure about the acquired business prior to the purchaser undertaking a binding commitment to make the acquisition. In other words, representations constitute a systematic smokeout of the data about the seller which the buyer feels is important ...
"... This focusing aspect of representations can often alert the purchaser to questionable areas for more detailed investigation, and may even provide ammunition for use in renegotiating the price or other terms of the deal.
"The second general purpose of representations, from the purchaser's viewpoint, is to set
the stage for the purchaser to walk away from the deal if the facts develop that make it unwise
to consummate the acquisition. Although in most cases the purchaser has been able to make
a preliminary investigation prior to signing the agreement and has relied on certain data
supplied to him by the seller, purchaser's defiitive investigation---the opening up of all seller's
doors and drawers-usually takes place ater the agreement has been signed." J. FREUND,
supra note 89, at 229-31 (emphasis in the original).
A similar point was made recently by the investment banker for St. Joe Minerals Corp.
in explaining Seagram Co.'s loss to Fluor Corp., the white knight, in the contest for St. Joe:
"Seagram 'underbid' for St. Joe because the Montreal-based distiller apparently had access
only to public information on St. Joe's asset value and earning power. 'Seagram was fighting
from the outside. It's like a guy fighting blind against a guy with clear vision.' " SeagramsEnds
S2.13 Billion Bidfor St.Joe, Wall St. J., Apr. 8, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
113. Assuming the offeror is risk-averse, the additional information can increase the
value of the acquisition even if it does not affect the expected return on the investment. See
W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETs 20-33 (1970); Modigliani &

Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68 (1974). Moreover, because
the information disclosed may eliminate some risks which the offeror had considered in determining an initial offering price, such as particular contingent liabilities, or may disclose assets,
such as favorable lease renewal terms, of which the offeror had not known, the expected
return on the transaction may increase as well.
114. Existing empirical data provide indirect support for the information value of the
negotiation process. Dodd, supra note 91, at 105, compared the market response to the cancellation of previously announced nonhostile acquisitions when the cancellation was due to target management veto and when the cancellation was due to the offeror backing away from
the transaction. When management vetoed the deal, the market price of the target shares,
although it dropped from the offer price, remained some 10% above the pre-announcement
price. Id. at 131. When the transaction was terminated by the offeror, the market value of
the target shares dropped, on average, to their pre-announcement price. Id. This suggests
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The functional equivalence argument thus provides no support
for allowing target management to interfere with shareholder access
to tender offers. Quite the contrary, equivalence reinforces the need
to restrict management's role in tender offers as a check on management conduct in the acquisition process generally.
B.

The Irrelevance of Ineftienqy

A second argument offered in support of management discretion
to block tender offers simply denies that current tender offer practice
operates to discipline inefficient or self-dealing management:
[One] would be hard-pressed to argue that the companies involved
in the most prominent hostile takeovers in 1976 and 1977 were
managed by inefficient executives. .

.

. [W]hile meaningful data

has not been collected and made generally available, the common
belief is that the typical target companies today are successful participants
in their particular fields and are managed by able personI t5
nel.

There is by now a fair amount of empirical research measuring
the performance of target companies and their securities in various
periods prior to their becoming the subject of a tender offer. These
studies generally conclude that the stock of target companies significantly underperforms the market during the pre-tender period." 6
Indeed, one study concludes that not only are target companies underperformers-to the extent of some 50% of potential value over a
relatively short period of time-but that much of the loss due to unthat the market interprets offeror termination as signalling the discovery of negative information concerning the target during the negotiating process.
115. Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 886-87. See Troubh, Characteristicsof Target Compa-

nies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1302 (1977); H. Williams, Tender Offers and the Corporate Director, Address before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Institute, in San Diego, Cal.
Jan. 17, 1980, reprintedin [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %82,445, at
82,876.
116. Dodd, supra note 91; Dodd, Company Takeovers and the Australian Equiy Market, I
AusTL. J. MCMT. 15 (1976); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Ors and Stockholder Retumn, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 351 (1977); Hindley, supra note 85; Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of
Cash Tender Offers and StockholderReturns, 33 J. FIN. 505, 509 (1978); Langetieg, An Application of
a Three-Factor Performance Index to Stockholder Gains from Merger, 6 J. FIN. EON. 365 (1978);
Smiley, supra note 86. A recent commentator has summarized his survey of these and other
studies as follows: "These results present a fairly consistent pattern. Acquired firms perform
poorly before acquisition and gain significantly upon acquisition. . . . These results . . .
show that acquired firms typically benefit from being acquired because their performance
prior to the merger was below average and was improved by the acquisition. This confirms
that the corporate merger is indeed a device for transferring assets out of the hands of less
competent managers into the hands of more competent ones. .. ." Asquith, 'Unpublished'
Paper, excerptedin ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 229-31
(R. Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980).
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derperformance is irreversible even after new management is installed. 117
It is unnecessary, however, to rest the entire response on empirical
measures of inefficiency. A target company may have greater value
to the acquirer than as an independent entity for reasons quite distinct from target management's lack of skills. For example, a company with underutilized production capacity that acquires a
competitor may reduce costs by spreading overhead over a larger volume in a manner not available to either company alone. Synergythe idea that operational or financial economies of scale may result in
a value for the combined entities greater than the sum of their independent values-explains some acquisitions in a fashion which expands the concept of inefficiency beyond that acknowledged by the
proponents of managerial discretion.' 18 Target management may be
inefficient because they lack the skills or inclination to effectively
manage their company; target management may also be "inefficient"
because the company they manage lacks the business opportunities
or financial strength necessary to improve its return on invested capital. Companies inefficient in this sense may, for a significant period
of time, nonetheless remain "successful participants in their particular fields."1 1 9
Moreover, even where the proposed transaction may seem to
yield no social gains, the absence of target company inefficiency does
not justify target management discretion to block a tender offer. For
117. Smiley, supra note 86, at 26.
118. See, e.g., P. STEINER, MERGERS 30-37 (1975); J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 630 (4th ed. 1977); Salter & Weinhold, Diversifation Via Acquisition:
Creating Value, HARV. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1978, at 166. The opportunity for operational
synergy results from possible sharing of product distribution systems or the elimination of
duplicative facilities. See, e.g., P. STEINER, supra, at 47-74; Alberts, The Proftabiliyof Growth,
in THE CORPORATE MERGER 247-62 (W. Alberts &J. Segall eds. 1966). The opportunity for
financial synergy results from the possible increased financial strength of the combined entity
and the opportunity for transfer of working capital between divisions in preference to outside
financing. See, e.g., Scott, On the Theog ofConglomerateMergers, 32 J. FIN. 1235 (1977); Salter &
Weinhold, supra; cf.0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 38, at 109-66 (describing advantages of multidivision form of corporate organization).
119. Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 887. Discussions of managerial inefficiency in the
context of the market for corporate control usually assume that the problem is personal to the
particular managers: They simply lack the intelligence or skills to run the target company as
well as alternative managers. For my purpose here, the broader concept of inefficiency described in the text is more helpful, since the market for corporate control facilitates provision
of business opportunities or financial resources to the target just as it facilitates provision of
more "efficient"-as narrowly defined-management. Where necessary, however, I will separate this broad "inefficiency" into personal inefficiency and "synergy" components. See notes
188-98 infra
and accompanying text.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:819

example, some argue that acquisitions motivated purely by a desire
for diversification are unlikely to benefit the shareholders of the acquiring corporation. 20 Noting that the price-earnings ratios of most
conglomerates trail the market as a whole, commentators claim that
the stock market does not value reduction in investment risk resulting
from diversification because individual shareholders can eliminate
having to
that risk through diversifying their own portfolios without
12 1
acquisition.
typical
a
in
reflected
pay the premium
Yet the potential inefficiency of the transaction-in contrast to
the inefficiency of the target company--does not justify allowing target management to block shareholder access to tender offers. The
argument against such mergers is not that target shareholders are injured by the transaction, but that shareholders of the acquiring corpo22
ration are injured because of the benefit given target shareholders.
For the target shareholders the operative concept remains the Fundamental Theorem of Exchange: that "voluntary trade is mutually
beneficial."'' 23 As for protecting shareholders of the offeror, the market also restricts the ability of acquiring company management to
manage inefficiently. 12 4 Target management is an unlikely substitute
for market discipline as a means of constraining offeror management.
I do not argue that there is no cause for concern over the pace of
acquisitions, principally by means of tender offers, in recent years.
Harold Williams has recently argued that the acquisition phenomenon diverts investment resources from more socially productive
uses.' 25 However, it seems highly unlikely that self-interested resist120. See, e.g., G. BENTSEN, supra note 3, at 31-33; H. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH ACQUISITION 41-46 (1980); Levy & Sarnat, Diversifation,PortfolioAnalysir and the Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FIN. 795 (1970); Mason & Goudzwaard,
Performance of Conglomerate Firms: A Portfolio Approach, 31 J. FIN. 39 (1976); Scott, supra note
118.
121. Mason & Goudzwaard, supra note 120 (comparing performance of conglomerate
firms with that of diversified portfolios); Salter & Weinhold, supra note 118, at 167-68.
122. See generaly Note, supra note 71.

123. J.

HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

164 (1976).

124. There is increasing evidence that market disfavor of wide diversification is causing
conglomerates to shed previously acquired businesses. See, e.g., G. BENTSEN, supra note 3, at
32-33; H. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, supra note 120, at 17 ("In 1976 divestitures involved over

half of all acquisitions versus approximately 10 percent in the 1960's.'); Lohr, Slimming Down:
The G4F Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1981, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
125. H. Williams, supra note 115, at 82,877 ("In the last five years, I would estimate that

$100 billion of corporate cash resources-resources which could have been devoted to new
production and employment opportunities-have been diverted to rearranging the ownership
of existing corporate assets through tender offers alone. These are reserves that do not flow
back as new capacity, improvements in productivity, new products or newjobs.'). Chairman
Williams does not address the question of what happens to the resources returned to target
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ance to acquisitions by target management will increase net "productive" investment by eliminating one alternative use for corporate
funds. The market for capital investment is highly competitive; a
preference by some firms at certain times for investment in acquisitions rather than internal expansion likely results from real economic
forces rather than the degree of discretion accorded target management.126 Indeed, Williams also points to regulation and prompt
competitive response to new products as factors which "encourage
the search for takeover targets rather than for capital spending, prodSuch major
uct development and innovation opportunities. "127
macroeconomic problems are unlikely to be cured by increased discretion on the part of target management. Efforts to correct misincentives for capital investment created by governmental regulation
are far more likely to be effective if directed at the problem's source.
C.

Which Shareholders Benefit?

Yet another justification for an expansive role for target management in tender offers admits that shareholders profit from a tender
offer, but focuses on the unsavory character of those tendering their
shareholders in cash tender offers. Unless the amounts paid are consumed or invested directly
in productive assets by shareholders, the sums must be reinvested in financial assets, either
directly or through financial intermediaries. See general' J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MARKET RATES AND FLOWS 1-40 (1978). Thus, Williams's argument cannot be that the funds
given to target shareholders are taken out of the financial system by, for example, being
stuffed in a mattress. Rather, the argument must be that the new investments do not finance
direct investment in real assets. This recharacterization of Williams's position does not alter
the response which follows in the text, but merely shifts the inquiry to why the former target
shareholders are presented with investment opportunities which favor other than real asset
production.
An additional problem with Williams's position is that it views all takeovers as having
the same unfavorable results. Even if one ignores eventual reinvestment by target shareholders, recent empirical research indicates that takeovers of smaller high-technology firms are
conducive to new production and employment opportunities because "capital formation by
[smaller technology-based firms] is enhanced by the possibility that stockholders will eventually be able to sell their stock at a tender offer premium." R. MAsULIS, ACQuIsrrION OF
TECHNOLOGY-BASED FIRMS BY TENDER OFFER: AN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

25 (SEC Capital Market Working Paper No. 1, 1980). Also, it has been argued that research
and development by smaller firms followed by takeover by larger companies when new products reach the production and marketing stage is an efficient way to organize the innovation
process. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKET AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 198-207 (1975); see G. BENTSEN, supra note 3, at 19-26.
126. The factors which might cause management to favor acquisitions over internal
expansion in the acquirer's own industry, direct investment in the new industry, or an increase in dividends are discussed in G. BENTSEN,Supra note 3, at 12-18. Since target management has had virtually complete discretion to reject tender offers during the period referred to
by Chairman Williams, it is hard to see what increasing that discretion will accomplish.
127. H. Williams, supra note 115, at 82,876.
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shares. The interests of these shareholders-negatively characterized
as speculators or arbitrageurs-in a quick profit are unfavorably
compared to the other shareholders' interests in the long-term future
of the corporation. 28 The resulting conclusion, that short-run trading profits are worthy of less consideration by target management
than, I suppose, long-term trading profits, is then offered to support
management efforts preventing these less worthy interests from prevailing.

12 9

Recognizing the actual role of arbitrageurs and speculators in the
tender offer process, however, belies the distinction between shortterm speculation and long-term investment. The success of an offer
depends on a variety of factors. Arbitrageurs offer to purchase the
target's stock at a price equal to the tender offer price discounted by
the arbitrageur's evaluation of the risk that the offer will be unsuccessful and that the acquired shares will then be sold in the market at
a lower price.' 30 Thus, it is not surprising that arbitrageurs favor a
tender offer. In effect, they stand as surrogates, albeit less risk-averse,
for long-term investors who have already demonstrated, by selling their
shares to the arbitrageurs, that they perceived their "long-term" interests were outweighed by the size of the premium. In other words,
the "short-term perspective"' ' of the arbitrageurs is a red herring;
their desire to sell merely reflects, by proxy, the desires of the selling
shareholders.
D. Management Knows Best
A more recent addition to the promanagement portfolio of arguments by Martin Lipton makes no claim about the overall efficiency
128. Eg., Lipton, supra note 105, at 104 ("Many of the lawsuits and much of the agitation for changes in the existing rules come from certain arbitrageurs and professional investors
whose short-term perspectives are not in accordance with the long-term interests of other
shareholders . . . ."); H. Williams, supra note 115, at 82,878 ("I [do not] want to see the
interests of the long-term shareholder, who behaves as a corporate owner--or of shareholders
over time-subordinated to the interests of speculators, who see profits in betting against the
corporation."). Professor Sharpe has noted that this type of distinction is often used "simply
to denote activities of which the speaker disapproves. One's friends are investors, one's enemies speculators." W. SHARPE, supra note 113, at 6.
129. "It would not be unfair to pose the poli) issue as: Whether the long-tern interests of the
nation's corporate sstem and economy should bejeopardizedin order to beneft speculators interested not in
the vitality and continuedexistence of the business enterprise in which thq have bought shares,but ony in a
quickprofit on the sale of those shares?" Lipton, supra note 105, at 104 (emphasis in the original).
130. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at 20. If arbitrageurs believe competitive bidding will cause the ultimate price to increase, they may pay more than the initial
offer price. Id For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of risk arbitrage, see Wyser-Pratte,
Risk Arbitrage, N.Y.U. Cj. DEVINE INST. FIN. BULL., May 1971, at 1.
131. Lipton, supra note 105, at 104.
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of tender offers, but asserts that interests of target shareholders in a
higher return on their investment are best served by allowing management discretion to block a tender offer. Lipton examined 36 unsolicited tender offers that were defeated by targets between the end
of 1973 and June 1979 and concluded that "the shares of more than
50% of the targets are either today at a higher market price than the
rejected offer price or were acquired after the tender offer was defeated at a price higher than the offer price."'132 On that basis, Lipton argues that shareholders are best served by giving primacy to
target management's judgment.
Lipton's analysis is subject to substantial methodological criticism. He takes no account, for example, of general price movements
during the relevant period, 133 nor is there an effort to discount future
values to present values to allow more accurate comparison. And the
methodologically more careful empirical studies, albeit limited in
number, 134 are flatly inconsistent with Lipton's conclusions. These
studies suggest that following an unsuccessful offer, target company
shareholders earn no more than a market return, and that a nontrivial portion of the bid premium is lost.' 3 5 Indeed, Lipton's data
refute his own conclusion. On initial examination, share values of 19
of the 36 target companies considered increased in price, and 17 decreased, relative to the defeated offer, measured as of the earlier of
132. Id at 106.
133. To the extent that the performance of the stocks in the Lipton sample reflects
movement in the general price levels of stocks, the same gains would have been available to
investors if the tender offer had been accepted through investing it in other stocks, but without giving up the premium offered on the tender.
134. As late as 1977 no study had evaluated the market reaction to unsuccessful tender
offers in the United States. Dodd & Ruback, supra note 116, at 352. A 1976 study had considered the issue with respect to Australian companies. Dodd, supra note 116.
135. See Bradley, Interfnm Tender O rs and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 35 J. Bus. 345
(1980); Dodd, supra note 91; Dodd & Ruback, su/pra note 116; Jarrel & Bradley, supra note 86;
Kummer & Hoffmeister, supra note 116. These studies present a consistent pattern. The
value of target shares increases substantially around the announcement date of a tender offer
to reflect the offered premium. Following defeat of the offer, the target shares drop in value
but remain above the original pre-offer price. This pattern suggests, as the investigators describe, that the market views the offer as favorable new information bearing on the future
value of the company and, therefore, supporting a higher post-rejection price. Other studies,
although not focused on unsuccessful transactions, confirm the value of tender offers and
mergers to target shareholders. R. MASULIS, supra note 125; A. OSBORNE, RETURNS TO
SHAREHOLDERS OF ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED COMPANIES: THE CASE OF ACQUISITIONS
OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED FIRMS IN THE OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET (SEC Capital Mar-

ket Working Paper No. 3, 1980); Firth, Takeovers, ShareholderReturns and the Theogy of the Firm,
94 Q.J. ECON. 235 (1980).
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August 10, 1979, or the date on which the target company was acquired by a different offeror. Of the 19 companies whose share prices
exceeded the rejected tender offer, two should be discounted since
they appear to have involved transactions in which a white knight
made a competitive bid at approximately the same time and in response to the defeated offer.' 36 Further, of the 17 remaining target
companies whose shares increased in value beyond the price of the
defeated offer, four show increases at a compounded annual rate of
less than 3%, hardly a tribute to management's investment acumen.' 3 7 Finally, and fully recognizing that my statistical efforts are
also misleading, 38 the subsequent share values of the 36 companies
reflect an average compounded annual rate of return to target company shareholders, on the money they would have received if the
tender offer had been successful, of -5.48%. 139 In short, the available
data, including Lipton's own, support the "popular belief on Wall
Street"' 40 that shareholders are disadvantaged by defeat of a tender
offer.
In an important respect, however, Lipton's data are less important than the argument based upon them. Capital market theory
tells us that the market-the shareholders and others acting en
masse-is the best unbiased estimate of the value of a corporation's
stock. 41 If target management prevents shareholders from responding to an offer, that valuation process is bypassed. The promanagement argument, however, suggests that management should be
allowed to block tender offers, and so "short-circuit" the valuation
process, because they are "better" market analysts. But this argument fails for the same reason as the functional equivalence argument: Even if management could "beat the market," there must be a
136. The two targets involved were Latrobe Steel Co. and Unitek Corp. While one
might argue that securing a white knight at a higher price justifies management resistance, see
notes 173-76 infra and accompanying text, that position is not available to Upton since he
asserts the more extreme position that management should have the discretion to ignore this
alternative as well. Lipton, supra note 105, at 109.
137. The four were Vail Associates, Inc., Inspiration Consolidated Copper, BraddockTerry Shoe Corp., and Property Trust of America.
138. Among other problems presented by this shorthand form of data analysis, and
which are not presented by the more sophisticated studies referred to in note 135 supa, is the
bias toward negative returns resulting from the effect of compounding on more recently rejected offers. Also, I did not weight the various offers by their total value in computing the
average, nor have I included dividends paid, if any, in the computation of annual return.
139. This figure excludes the white knight transactions referred to in note 136 supra. If
these transactions are included, the figure is -2.4%.
140. Lipton, supra note 105, at 106.
141. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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mechanism to check management's own interest in the transaction.
And if management's superior investment analysis is based on inside
information, the only plausible explanation for a claim of unusual
ability, eliminating management discretion to block a tender offer
does not deprive shareholders of the benefit of this skill. Management may still make public the reasons for its belief that the market
undervalues the corporation, 1 2 and rational shareholders will not
tender at an "inadequate" price unless something in the tender offer
process itself prevents realistic shareholder consideration of management's position. It is this point to which the next promanagement
argument is directed.
E. The Shareholders Will Make the Wrong Decision
A different line of argument suggesting that shareholders, left to
their own devices, will respond to a tender offer in a manner contrary
to their own best interests is based not on the shareholder lack of
wisdom, or even on management's superior skill, but on the "special
dynamics"14' 3 of the tender offer process. It is argued that, as in the
game theorists' "prisoner's dilemma,"'" it may be in the best interests of each individual shareholder to tender, even if the shareholders
as a group ought not to tender. I4 5 Unfortunately, the prisoner's dilemma analogy is inapposite.
In game theory terms, the central characteristic of a prisoner's
dilemma is an array of benefits and detriments associated with potential courses of action such that, in the absence of cooperation, rational individual behavior yields suboptimal results.' 46 Assume a
tender offer is made for 50% of the shares of a corporation with two
50% shareholders; that each shareholder must tender all of his shares;
142. Management's possession of nonpublic information which would alter the market's
valuation of the target company's stock is not inconsistent with market efficiency in the semistrong form. See, e.g., J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, sutpra note 14, at 87-96. It must be recognized that management's disclosure of nonpublic information may not always be costless; one
can imagine new product and test market information that would have an adverse effect if
prematurely disclosed. Real world solutions, however, are not always costless. To condemn
improvements by comparison to a hypothetical world where perfection is costless has been
aptly called "the 'Nirvana' form of analysis." Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 328.
143. Lipton, supra note 105, at 113.
144. See generallv A. RAPOPORT & A. COHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965). For an
easily accessible introduction to game theory see J. WILLIAMS, THE COMPLEAT STRATEGY
(1966).
145. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 21, at 154-56; Lipton, supra note 105, at
114; ef. Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 896 (individual shareholder decisions create collective
decision better made by corporate entity through management).
146. The form of analysis reflected in the following text is drawn from S. BRAMS, PARADOXES IN POLITICS 79-112 (1976).
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that if both tender, their shares will be taken up pro rata; that the
offer is made at a $5 premium over market; and that the value of the
shares not accepted by the offeror will drop by $10. The choices facing the shareholders are expressed in the following payoff matrix.
SHAREHOLDER 2
Don't
Tender
Don't Tender

0,

0

+5,

-10

Tender
-10,

+5

SHAREHOLDER 1
Tender

-2

1/2,

-2

1/2

For the shareholders as a group, the best course of action would
be not to tender; any other alternative results in a net loss. If, however, the shareholders must act independently, the optimal result is
unlikely to occur. Each shareholder must recognize that if he, seeking the best group outcome, does not tender, and the other shareholder, acting selfishly, does, the selfless shareholder will bear
substantial costs. As represented in the northeast and southwest
quadrants of the matrix, in that situation the tendering shareholder
gains five while the nontenderer loses ten. The rational response, of
course, is to tender, thus avoiding all risk of losing ten. Since the
decision calculus is the same for both shareholders, both will tender
and the offer will be a success even though both shareholders would
have been better off had the offer failed. This is the essence of the
promanagement argument-that shareholders must tender even
though it is not the most desirable result.
The prisoner's dilemma, however, requires that particular conditions be met before pursuing individual self-interest yields less than
optimal results. In our example, the crucial characteristic is that the
per-share premium ($5) is less than the amount by which a share
either not tendered, or tendered but not accepted, is reduced in value
by the success of the offer. 147 This condition can be stated more generally: A prisoner's dilemma is present only if the gain from the premium offered is less than the anticipated loss on shares retained after
148
the offer's success.

147. This result also depends on the assumption that the shareholders lack an available
and enforceable mechanism, for example a trust, which would ensure cooperative action. In
light of the transaction costs inherent in shareholder action in a public corporation, the assumption seems a reasonable one.
148. If the sum of the premium on tendered and accepted shares exceeds the sum of the
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This condition should not often be satisfied in a tender offer setting. In typical 2-stage offers, the price paid minority shareholders in
the freezeout transaction is no lower than the original offer and occasionally has been higher.' 4 9 Thus, a shareholder cannot be disadvantaged by following a nontender strategy when failure of the offer is
perceived as the optimal collective response, because there is neither
incentive for other shareholders to take advantage of his public spirit
nor loss to the nontendering shareholder if others' perception of the
public good differs from his own.' 50
The potential for a prisoner's dilemma is similarly unlikely in a
partial tender where no freezeout transaction is contemplated-the
setting presented in the matrix. Consider the offeror's position. The
market value of the target's shares declines by $10 per share following the offer. If that decline applies to the shares acquired by the
offeror as well, then by virtue of the transaction the offeror will have
lost $15 per share. Alternatively, if the decline applies only to minority shares, then one wonders why only minority shares would suffer so
significant a loss. While a possible explanation might be the offeror's
opportunity to loot the target, in such extreme settings the fiduciary
decrease in value of the shares remaining outstanding after the offer, then the transaction,
taken as a whole, has a positive value for the shareholders and it would be in the best interest
of all shareholders, as a group and individually, to tender. As such, the prisoner's dilemma is
not present.
149. Dodd & Ruback, supra note 116, at 371, found that minority shareholders in corporations which had been subject to a successful tender offer for control earn significant abnormal returns in the month of the freezeout transaction. A less formal survey found that the
freezeout price offered following "any and all" offers averaged approximately 1% above the
original tender offer price. Borden & Weiner, An Invesiment DecisionAnalysis ofCash Tender Or
Disclosure, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 553, 570 (1978). One would expect the existence of appraisal
rights in the freezeout transaction to make unlikely a freezeout price below that at which a
majority of the shares had recently traded in an arm's length transaction.
The recent contest between Wheelabrator-Frye Inc. and McDermott Inc. for Pullman
Inc. is the only case I know of in which a threat of a freezeout price lower than the tender
offer price was used as a strategy to force tenders. At the last stage of the contest, McDermott
raised its offer for 54% of Pullman's outstanding stock from $34.50 to $54.00 a share, thereby
exceeding Wheelabrator's $52.50 offer. At the same time, McDermott announced that it
would pay only $39 per share in the contemplated second-step transaction. In contrast, the
second-step transaction contemplated by Wheelebrator carried the same value as the tender
offer. The tactic was unsuccessful. Almost immediately following McDermott's announcement, 3,822,000 of the 3,882,000 Pullman shares previously tendered to McDermott were
withdrawn. Wall St.J., Sept. 23, 1980, at 4, col. 1; id., Sept. 26, 1980, at 11, col. 1. The result
should not have been surprising. The Wheelabrator offer had a combined value of $594
million while the combined value of the McDermott offers was only $525 million.
150. If the freezeout price is the same as the tender price, shareholders do better to
tender because of the time value of money. But the delay between first- and second-step
transactions is generally short, and it would take years of delay to turn a typical tender offer
premium into an outright loss, and more years until the loss exceeded the premium as the
prisoner's dilemma requires.
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duty owed the minority should provide adequate protection."5 ' Existing empirical studies are consistent with this conclusion. The postoffer price of nontendered shares does not fall below their pre-offer
price, a result inconsistent with offeror looting. 52 Thus, the prisoner's dilemma argument simply does not apply to the tender offer
setting.
The arguments which suggest that shareholders will choose, or be
forced into, conduct which is not optimal even from their own perspective, are thus not convincing. Management discretion to prevent
a tender offer simply cannot be justified on paternalistic grounds. If
discretion is nonetheless to be accepted, it must be because there are
other interests which are benefited by an enlarged role for target
management despite the detrimental impact on shareholders.
F. CorporateSocial Responsibility
There is a certain irony in the argument offered by some authorities that responsiveness to nonshareholder constituencies---employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, local communities, and the
national economy-justifies management discretion in preventing
takeovers. 5 3 As Chairman Williams, himself no advocate of shareholder autonomy in tender offers, 54 states, "[t]he corporate community cannot have it both ways. It cannot argue against added
measures-legislative or otherwise-directed to improve corporate
accountability by relying on the discipline of the marketplace as a
vehicle to depose inadequate management, and then seek to neutralize that discipline by anti-takeover provisions. 11 5 5 Nonetheless, since
commentators, corporate management, and occasionally courts 5' as151. While there is a good reason to doubt the extent to which fiduciary doctrine provides an effective check against self-dealing in intercompany transactions within an affiliated
group, see note 195 infra and accompanying text, the magnitude of the impact on the subsidiaries' operations would not seem large enough to account for a decrease in value of the size
specified in the text.
152. Bradley, supra note 135, at 360-65 (on average, target shares' post-successful-offer
price exceeds pre-announcement price); Dodd & Ruback, supra note 116, at 370 (target company post-successful-offer abnormal returns not significantly different from zero); accord, R.
MASULIS, supra note 125, at 18-20. It should also be noted that in the unlikely event the
conditions necessary for a prisoner's dilemma were present, a competing offeror would have
an incentive to offer a higher price to the target's holders.
153. E.g., Liman, Has the Tender Offer Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. RFv. 687

(1978); Lipton, supra note 105, at 105-06, 117; Pearlmutter, supra note 105; Steinbrink, supra
note 105, at 899-900, 902.
"154. See notes 125-27 supra and accompanying text.
155. H. Williams, supra note 115, at 82,881.
156. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972), is the most commonly cited
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sert the argument, it warrants consideration.
A first step is to define "corporate social responsibility." I will
adopt David Engel's definition: "the obligations and inclinations
. . . of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to pursue social
ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." 15 7 Note that the definition excludes acts beneficial to
nonshareholder constituencies which, although detrimental to profits
in the short run, lead to long-run profit maximization.' 58
Second, note that management which engages in acts of corporate social responsibility will rarely, if ever, be held liable for corporate waste. The distinction between corporate altruism and long-run
profit maximization is blurred. Whether community aid efforts reflect the corporation's self-interest, however enlightened, or are
merely charitable, involves precisely the type of decision review of
which the courts appropriately have eschewed by applying the business judgment rule.' 5 9 So long as management is disingenuous when
case for the proposition that directors have an obligation to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in making corporate decisions, even at the expense of shareholder
interests. Heraldwas a derivative action against management of the Denver Post Co. claiming
that a variety of corporate actions were intended to prevent a takeover of the newspaper and
to entrench control of the corporation in the founding Bonfils family. Judge Hill presented,
albeit in dictum, the most straightforward adoption of the social responsibility position of
which I am aware: "We are fully cognizant of the well established corporate rule of law
which places corporate officers and directors in the position of fiduciaries for the stockholders.
Basic in that rule of law is the profit motive of the corporate entity. In this case we have a
corporation engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan newspaper, whose obligation and duty is something more than the making of corporate profits. Its obligation is
threefold: to the stockholders, to the employees, and to the public.
A corporation publishing a newspaper such as the Denver Post. . . has an obligation to the public, that is, the thousands of people who buy the paper, read it, and rely upon
its contents. . . . Because of these relations with the public, a corporation publishing a great
newspaper such as the Denver Post is, in effect, a quasi-public institution." Id at 1091,
1094-95 (citations omitted).
One is tempted playfully to distinguish the case on first amendment grounds: Only management of "a great newspaper" may resist a takeover despite the uncontroverted benefit to
the shareholders. However, other businesses--for example, the proverbial New England town
mill-have an equally important impact on the public in their communities, and the intrusion of the first amendment into internal corporate management should be barred by the
state action doctrine if nothing else. In any event, it was recently reported that management
overcame its belief that "local independent ownership was preferable to chain ownership"
and sold the paper to the Los Angeles Times chain. Times Mirror to Buy Denver Post: $95
Millon Price Surrises Experts, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1980, at 37, col. 4.
157. Engel, supra note 13, at 5-6.
158. Id at 9. Indeed, recent critics of management attitudes have charged management
with an excessively short-term orientation. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 66.
159. See notes 8-16 supra and accompanying text.
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necessary, legal standards do not bar management from following a
"socially responsible" course. 6 °
Thus, to the extent the tender offer process poses a question of
corporate social responsibility, the question is not how to define it or
whether it is a good thing. Rather, the question raised by asserting
that issues of social responsibility justify target management's discretion to block a tender offer is more narrow and ideologically neutral:
What checks are there on management's decision to engage in a particular level of nonprofitmaking, altruistic behavior? The issue is
whether management-through defensive tactics-may secure immunity from the market consequences of its altruistic decisions comparable to the immunity from legal consequences provided by the
business judgment rule.
To be sure, there is something quaint about a general assertion
that matters of social responsibility require allowing target management to prevent tender offers; it has the decided flavor of Senator
Williams's oft-cited reference, when introducing the Williams Act, to
the fate of "proud old companies" at the hands of "white collar pirates." 1 6 ' But there is no reason to adopt the assumption that the
management of all offerors are less socially responsible than those of
all targets. Acts of social responsibility are no more than "a specialized class of suboptimization ' ' 162 by target management which, as
with other forms of management discretion which courts cannot effectively regulate, the structure of the corporation relies upon the
tender offer process to control.16 3 If shareholders believe management is too responsible for their taste, they will tender their shares at
the offered premium, some part of which reflects the potential gain if
suboptimization-social responsibility-is reduced.' 64 Thus, to assert social responsibility as a basis for management discretion to
block a tender offer is to argue not only that corporate social respon160. Engel, supra note 13, at 63.
161. 111 CONG. REC. 28,257-58 (1965). It is intriguing that the terms "raider" and
"pirate," while often used, are rarely defined. Professor Cary has made one of the rare efforts:
"As a Professor, I sometimes define a raider as somebody else's client." Cary, CorporateDevices
Used to Insulate Management From Attack, 25 Bus. LAw. 839, 842 (1970).
162. Engel, sura note 13, at 8.
163. See notes 84-98 supra and accompanying text.
164. A decision not to tender need not, however, indicate a shareholder's commitment
to corporate social responsibility. Particularly in the case of a "home-town" corporation, the
decision of a local shareholder may involve consumption as well as capital gain elements. See
generaly Grossman & Stiglitz, On Value Maximization and Alternative Objectives of the Firm, 32 J.
FIN. 389 (1977); Hirshleifer & Riley, The Analytis of Uncertainty and Infornation-An Expositog,
Sun, ,, 16 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1375, 1392-93 (1979).
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sibility is a good thing, but that management should have the unrestrained discretion to determine how much corporate capital should be
devoted to purposes management deems socially responsible. That position is quite difficult to support, and opposition need not be based
on the proposition that corporate altruism results in inefficiency.
The decision as to what activities are socially responsible is a
political rather than a corporate or economic one. Target management has no special expertise in such decisions, nor is there any reason to believe that the vision of a just society held by management
16 5
will be shared by any larger body, whether shareholders or not.
Rather, the issue turns on the appropriate institution to make this
type of decision. The tender offer process constrains target management's social as well as business judgments; there is nothing about
management's social judgments which renders them more sacrosanct
than management's business judgments.

IV.

THE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR TARGET MANAGEMENT

Examining the common arguments favoring management discretion to block tender offers discloses nothing which justifies interfering
with the tender offer's central role in the structure of the corporation.
It does not automatically follow, however, that target management
has no place in the tender offer process. Indeed, recognizing that the
corporate structure assigns to shareholders the decisionmaking role in
tender offers helps identify a proper role for management. By focusing on the shareholders' decision, one can identify management functions which aid the shareholder in making the decision and thereby
facilitate the proper interaction of the capital market with the corporate structure. These functions derive from the shareholders' need
for information and from the inability of shareholders to bargain effectively.
A. ProvidingShareholders with Information
A tender offer requires a shareholder to make one of two types of
decisions: (1) in a cash tender offer the shareholder must compare
the cash price offered with the present market price of the target security, and perhaps with the potential price of that security at some
future point if the offer is unsuccessful;1 66 and (2) in an exchange
165. Engel, supra note 13, at 29-31.
166. Where the offer is for any or all of the outstanding shares, the evidence suggests
that a second-step freezeout occurs with sufficient certainty and promptness that consideration of the value of minority shares of target stock following the offeror's taking of control is
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offer the shareholder must compare the expected value of the offeror's security with the present market price of the target security
held, and perhaps with the potential of that security at some future
point if the offer is unsuccessful. In both settings, shareholders benefit from information which target management may provide most
effectively.
Consider first the cash offer. If an offer is made for the target's
securities at a premium above the pre-offer price, a rational shareholder will tender in the absence of information concerning the target which indicates that the pre-offer market price was incorrect and
that the value exceeds the tender offer price. 167 The more information available concerning the target company, the more accurate is
the market price of target company stock and, therefore, the better
the shareholder's decision. Since target management's opposition to
the offer, if in good faith, is presumably based on nonpublic information in its possession, such information can be made available at the
expense of issuing a press release. 61 In this setting, target management's presumed interest in defeating the offer will cause them to
disclose such information, if it exists.' 69 If the market agrees with
management's evaluation of the information, the price of the target's
stock will rise above the tender offer price, and the offer will be defeated. Thus, target management's self-interest and target shareholders' interests happily coincide.
Management may also provide information concerning the value
of the offeror's securities in the exchange offer setting. Information is
not costless; it will be produced only to the point where its benefits
unnecessary. Borden & Weiner, supra note 149, at 573-74. Where the cash tender offer is for
less than all of the outstanding shares, it appears that a second-step transaction is less likely
and, in any event, less prompt. Id at 574-75. In that case, the value of the shares in a
controlled subsidiary must also be considered.
167. See note 142 sura.
168. But see note 142 supra.
169. It has been demonstrated that, at least in the absence of transaction costs, a competitor will disclose information about the quality of the good being sold without the need for
compulsion. Moreover, a seller will have an incentive to take action which demonstrates that
its good is better than that being offered by the competitor by taking actions which, in the
best of all possible worlds,.could not be followed by a lower-quality competitor. Target management is, in effect, selling (convincing its shareholders to retain its stock); it should disclose
all favorable information about the target and, in the circumstance of a less than any or all
offer in which there is an expectation that there will not be a second-step transaction, all
unfavorable information about the offeror. See Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in
REPORT ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 101, at 637-39; Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 (1980); Ross, DisclosureRegulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Financial Theo.7 and Signalling Theog,, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION (F. Edwards ed. 1979).
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equal the cost of production, an equilibrium obviously reached somewhere short of complete information as long as there is a positive
production cost. In an exchange offer, target management's advantage lies in its incentive-that of self-interest-to centrally acquire,
analyze, and disseminate information concerning the offeror in a
more efficient manner than its shareholders and, perhaps, financial
analysts. Without this centralized production, two unfavorable results are possible. First, individual shareholders may find the costs
associated with evaluating the new securities so great that they do
not seriously attempt to do so, even though the information's value to
all shareholders exceeds the cost of centrally producing and disseminating it. 7 ° Second, even if individual production is worthwhile for
larger institutional holders or financial analysts, these parties may
not have the incentive to disseminate the information, although the
price effects of their acting on it may ease the problem. In any event,
central production of the information by a single institution does reduce costs. 7 1 Only target management has an incentive, similarly
undiluted by free-rider problems, to produce and disseminate such
information.
Target management thus has a special role in producing tender
offer information, particularly where the information, whether because it favorably reflects the target's future, or unfavorably reflects
the value of the offeror securities, suggests that the target's securities
have a value higher than that offered. By providing that information, management facilitates shareholder comparison of the value of
the target securities with the value of the tender offer. While this can
be styled a defensive tactic because it protects target management, it
remains desirable because it works through the market for corporate
control, rather than by preventing the market from operating by
172
foreclosing shareholder access to an offer.
170. Beaver, supra note 169, at 635.
171. It has been argued that the acquisition of information solely for trading purposes
may have no social value. If this is correct, there are efficiency gains in having the information produced and disseminated centrally rather than having the same nonproductive information produced independently over and over again. See, e.g., W. BEAVER, FINANCIAL
REPORTING: AN AccOUNTING REVOLIMON 46, 194 (1981) and sources referred to therein.
172. It has been argued that any disclosure of information as a defensive tactic is undesirable because it has the effect of reducing the overall incidence of tender offers in the society
and, thus, limiting their efficiency-inducing impact. Since information disclosure may also be
one form of bargaining, and since the point bears generally on any bargaining role for management, I will consider it in that context. See notes 181-200 injra and accompanying text.
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The BargainingRole-Looking for a White Knight

It has been widely argued that target management resistance to
tender offers, rather than reflecting a self-serving interest in preserving control, is merely the mechanism by which bargaining over price
occurs when the formal offer is made to the shareholders rather than
to management.1 73 Sellers and buyers enter negotiations with floor
and ceiling prices in mind in any exchange; where the actual transaction price reached falls within that range is determined by the parties' strategic behavior. The more specialized form of exchange
represented by the tender offer, however, is "complicated because of
the fact that a corporation is a common property to its shareholders."' 74 Strategic behavior by multiple sellers-like shareholders in a
tender offer-requires incurring coordination costs, which in a public
corporation are likely to be prohibitive. 75 Bargaining by management, in contrast, does not involve shareholder coordination costs
and can thus benefit shareholders in situations where the shareholders themselves would not organize. Existing empirical evidence supports this analysis; tender offers initially resisted by management
appear to result in higher premiums than offers met by manage76
ment's approval or neutrality.'
Identifying management's appropriate role requires more, however, than merely recognizing the potential value of bargaining to
target shareholders. A theme throughout this article has been that
management conduct in a tender offer is unavoidably tainted by conflict of interest; recognizing that management opposition to a tender
offer may be a bargaining tactic is insufficient, absent a means to
distinguish bargaining in good faith from self-serving behavior,
where either can result in the offer not being made. 1 77 To carve out a
173. E.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 21, at 156-59; Lipton, supra note 105, at
106-08; Steinbrink, supra note 105, at 893-96.
174. Grossman & Hart, supra note 169, at 333.
175. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 57, at 107-09 ("the costs of securing
agreement, within the decisionmakinggroup, increase as the size of the group increases.") (emphasis in the original). See generally Heymann, supra note 57.
176. P. DAvEY, supra note 2, at 27; Chatlos, The SEC vs.Investors on Tender Offers, HARV.
Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 6, 7 (reporting an average 75% premium in friendly offers and
72% in unfriendly offers, but a 91% premium where there are competing bids); Kummer &
Hoffmeister, supra note 116, at 511-14; Lipton, supra note 105, at 108 (reporting unpublished
study by Goldman, Sachs & Co. of 85 takeover bids between Jan. 1, 1976 and June 8, 1979
which found that in 95% of the cases where acquisition followed resistance, the final offer
exceeded the original offer).
177. The more balanced proponents of management bargaining recognize the potential
for abuse. See, e.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 21, at 158.
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bargaining exception from the general prohibition against opposition
to tender offers thus requires that the permissible bargaining tactics
not have a significant potential for preempting shareholder decisions.
Note that the character of the inquiry has now shifted substantially. We are no longer concerned with whether management
should be allowed to defeat an offer-we concluded that the structure of the corporation was inconsistent with allowing management
this role-but only with under what circumstances management
should be allowed to bargain to improve an initial offer. The issue is
now whether the risk of bad faith can be minimized without destroying the potential value of management's bargaining for shareholders.
The professional literature evaluating defensive tactics suggests
that if the offeror makes a well-priced cash offer, is patient, and commits no irreparable error,' 78 the offer is likely to get to the shareholders. 1 79 If this is correct, the principal bargaining tactic available to
management is not the threat of defensive tactics, but obtaining a
competitive offer from a white knight. This approach is consistent
with shareholder autonomy, the structural principle which should
govern the allocation of roles in a tender offer. If the original offer is
defeated, the defeat results not from management bargaining, but
from shareholder rejection of the initial offer in favor of an alternative offer secured by management. Happily, this tactic also has
promise of strategic effectiveness. A higher price merely reduces the
potential profit to an offeror without eliminating the incentive to bid.
Indeed, information available to management but not to the initial
offeror may indicate a higher value for the target, in effect raising an
offeror's ceiling price. 180
In short, if management bargaining tactics are limited to the
threat or success of securing a higher offer from another party, then
there is little potential for management misusing the bargaining process for self-serving ends, and the possibility for shareholder benefit is
still substantial. Put differently, bargaining limited to securing a
178. The most prevalent offeror errors are disclosure problems under the Williams Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1976). Increasingly, however, courts have allowed the offer to proceed
following amendment of the offering material. See general5 Wachtell, sufira note 2, at 1438.
There are, however, situations where the offeror chooses not to amend because it views the
disclosure required as imposing excessive substantive costs. See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (withdrawal of offer following requirement of disclosure concerning sensitive foreign payments beyond generic disclosure required by the SEC in
its voluntary disclosure program).
179. See, e.g., Liman, supra note 153, at 688-89; Reuben & Elden, supra note 2, at 442.
180. See notes 112-14surra and accompanying text.
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higher offer is a defensive tactic consistent with shareholder interests
because it operates by effectuating rather than interfering with the
market for corporate control.
While acknowledging that shareholders of a target company
faced with an existing offer will benefit from management bargaining, a number of commentators argue that shareholders of all potential targets as a class, and the economy as a whole, are adversely
affected by the potential for such conduct. 8 1 The argument is that
the threat of a tender offer constrains management's discretion to
perform inefficiently or to self-deal. Thus, anything which reduces
the incidence of tender offers reduces the power of the threat to constrain management and is detrimental to society.
The problem with competitive bidding in the face of an initial
offer, it is argued, is that the initial offeror incurs sunk costs in identifying and evaluating the target company. These investment costs
must be covered by expected profit on the takeover. A competing
bidder does not incur these sunk information costs, since the target is
already identified and target management will assist the competing
bidder in evaluating the target's value. As a result, the transaction is
profitable for the competing bidder at a higher price than for the
initial bidder. This increases the risk associated with investment in
takeover investigations and decreases the return associated with those
investments. Not only do competitive bids increase the likelihood
that a competitor will win, with the result that the sunk costs are
entirely lost, but by increasing the price necessary for success, they
reduce the potential profit associated with the investment. Therefore, the incentive to make initial offers, and hence the total number
of offers, decrease.
I find the argument unpersuasive on a number of levels. First,
the sunk cost argument seems to me significantly overstated. In any
tender offer of substantial size the information costs associated with
identifying and evaluating the target are a small proportion of the
entire purchase price, 182 and the white knight must also incur costs in
verifying and assessing the significance of information provided by
target management. One cannot help but suspect that success in
181. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Ofer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1175-80 (1981); Grossman & Hart, supra note 86, at 58
n.25; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 86, at 382-87.
182. For example, the acquiring company's investment banker, which often undertakes
the burden of identifying potential targets, appears to earn fees of something less than 1% of
the acquisition price representing, on a $50 per share transaction, less than 50 cents per share.
Outside ProfessionalsPlay an IncreasingRole in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 86, at 1, col. 6.
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most major transactions does not turn on differences of this magnitude.

t8 3

More importantly, I suspect that the sunk costs are investments
with a positive expected return even if the offeror is ultimately outbid. Increasingly, a potential bidder takes a substantial block position in the stock of a target before announcing its intentions.t"" If the
initial offeror is outbid, it will simply tender its target shares to its
competitor, or sell them in the market, at a per-share profit approximately equal to the premium it initially offered plus the amount by
which its offer was exceeded. McDermott, Inc.'s gross profit of approximately $15.5 million on shares purchased during its losing contest with Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc. for Pullman, Inc. is illustrative of
5
8

the phenomenon.1

This phenomenon reflects, of course, no more than that the risk of
competitive bidding, like most financial risks, can be hedged. The
sunk information costs are an investment in a risky asset whose return derives from successfully completing the acquisition and whose
risk is that the bidder will lose the acquisition to a higher bidder.
Purchase of target shares in the market prior to making the offer
hedges that risk because the return on that asset varies inversely with
the return on the investment in information. Indeed, if the initial
offeror treats the returns associated with a successful acquisition as
certain, the effect of the hedge is to allow the initial offeror to guarantee a risk-free return on its investment in information. 8 6 Thus, it is
183. The more substantial advantage possessed by the white knight may be its access to
more and better information than that possessed by the initial offeror, see notes 112-14 supra
and accompanying text, not the ability to free-ride.
184. See note 25 supra.
185. McDermott held 513,000 Pullman shares acquired at an average price of $22, for
which Wheelabrator-Frye bid $52. It also held another 60,000 shares acquired at higher
prices but below the Wheelabrator offer. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1980, at 7, col. 5. Thus,
McDermott's gross profit on the transaction was in excess of $15.5 million. The total outside
expenses incurred by all three parties to the transaction, including investment banker fees,
were estimated at only $17 million, at least $6 million of which was paid by Pullman to its
investment banker. See note 86 supra. Even more recently, Seagrams Co. earned $10,659,750
on an approximately one month investment of $13,980,000 as a result of its loss of St. Joseph
Minerals Corp. to Fluor Corp. Seagrams Ends $2.13 Billion Bidfor St. Joe, supra note 112.
186. This assumes that there is no risk that the acquisition will fail for other reasons. To
be sure, the greater the likelihood that the initial bidder will lose the acquisition to a competitive bidder, the greater the likelihood it will earn the presumably lower risk-free rate.
Whether this reduction in return will result in a reduction in the number of initial offers is a
function of the potential initial offeror's alternative investments. And even if a reduction in
the frequency of initial offers does result, this cost must still be compared to the benefits of
competitive bidding. This balance is considered next in the text.
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not at all clear that the potential for competition should reduce the
frequency of initial bids. 8 7
A second problem with the argument asserting the evils of soliciting competitive bids is that it ignores the efficiency-inducing effect of
price competition. As a general principle, allocating resources
among competing claimants by price is desirable because it places
resources with the most efficient users. To assert that one should
maximize the total number of tender offers without regard to the
allocative benefits of price competition, one must assume that all offerors can make equally efficient use of target resources. This is unlikely. Indeed, one major explanation for the efficiency of mergerssynergy 1 8 8-assumes differing abilities to make use of the target's assets. The theory ultimately turns upon the fit of the particular offeror, or the skills of the particular offeror's management, with the
target company, and I see no basis for assuming these attributes are
identical among competing bidders. Thus, even if competitive bidding reduces the overall number of offerors, the increase in efficiency
from allocating target assets to their most efficient user must be balanced against the reduction in efficiency from fewer offers. While
this balance cannot be easily identified, the greater the importance of
synergy as an explanation for the acquiring company's gains, the
more important the efficiency gain through price competition relative to the efficiency loss due to a lower frequency of tender offers.
And at least a preliminary sense of the direction of the balance can
be gained by examining some of the empirical evidence which has
been offered concerning shareholder returns from acquisitions.
187. Indeed, one cannot escape the suspicion that this phenomenon may actually encourage initial offers. If the initial offer is viewed as so distasteful that, at the hint of a takeover threat, the target management will seek a white knight-as seems to be the case with
offers made by companies controlled, for example, by Victor Posner-the announcement of
an initial block position may make a higher competing bid virtually certain even if the
"raider" had no intention of a takeover, but acquired the block hoping to precipitate a competing takeover by someone else. Hirshleifer & Riley, supra note 164, at 1404-06, identify the
potential for realizing through such speculation the value of information produced, and note
that the incentive is then to disseminate rather than protect the confidentiality of the information. They also note that the ability to speculate may even lead to "excessive devotion of
resources" to the production of new information-in our setting to monitoring potential target companies. Id at 1405. This would suggest that specialists in monitoring-a new form of
information intermediary-would develop, whose interest would be in disclosing the information discovered after taking a speculative position in the potential target's stock, thereby eliminating the sunk cost problem assertedly facing initial bidders. Casual evidence of the extent
to which market professionals now play the "takeover game" is consistent with this prediction.
188. Se note 119 supra.
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It is helpful to imagine what kind of opportunity might be
presented by a target which would be exploitable with equal efficiency by potential acquirers. The example which comes to mind is
a target whose management is inefficient in the sense that its managers lack the necessary skills or intelligence-if more talented managers were available, the target company would be more valuable.
Assuming that talented management is a commodity generally available to acquiring corporations, an assumption consistent with the evidence that acquiring companies have generally outperformed the
market,' 8 9 the conditions necessary for competitive bidding to result
in inefficiency are satisfied. Insight into whether this form of opportunity is the motivation for tender offers can be drawn from available
data. If the motivation of a successful tender offer is to increase the
efficiency of the target firm, the value of the target firm should increase substantially following the acquisition, and this subsequent increase in target firm value should be the source of the acquirer's gain
from the transaction.
The data do not appear consistent with this conclusion. While
the price of target company stock increases following completion of
the transaction relative to its pre-offer value, perhaps reflecting some
gain from the displacement of inefficient management,' 90 "this reevaluation is significantly less than the premium paid target shareholders. . . . [A]cquiring firms did not profit from the purchase and
subsequent appreciation in the target shares; they suffered an average capital loss of 13% on each target share they bought." ' 9 ' The
source of gains to the acquirer seems inconsistent with the inefficiency assumption underlying the conclusion that competitive bidding is undesirable. 9 2
In what manner, then, do acquiring companies gain from the
transaction? The data indicate that gains accrue from increases in
the postoffer price of the acquirer- stock.193 This is most consistently
explained by synergistically motivated acquisitions-"corporate acquirers value target shares primarily for the attached rights to control
of the target's resources. ' 19 4 If the acquirer can more than proportionately appropriate the synergistic benefit, the postoffer increase in
the value of the acquirer's shares will not be matched in magnitude
by the postoffer increase in the shares of the target-precisely the
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
Bradley, supra note 135, at 364; Jarrell & Bradley, Supra note 86, at 392-93.
Bradley, supra note 135, at 364.
Id at 350-51.
Id at 365-67; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 86, at 381-82.
Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 86, at 381-82.
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result described in the data, and one consistent with the numerous
opportunities for the parent company to favor95itself at the expense of
the subsidiary in an affiliated group setting.
The point may be clarified by referring to a familiar, albeit extreme, example. In Perlman v. Feldmann,196 Korean War price controls
prevented Newport Steel Company from exploiting the wartime steel
shortage by charging a market-clearing price. If a steel consumer
gained control of Newport Steel, it would gain the benefit of an assured source of supply in a short market, and so long as it paid Newport only the legally set price, it would appropriate all the synergistic
gains from the transaction. The acquirer's gain would then come
from the increase in the price of its stock resulting from the value of
the "rights to control of the target's resources,"' 97 precisely the result
described by the data.' 9 8
The data on postoffer prices thus seem more consistent with synergistic motives for acquisitions. And the more synergy explains the
gains from the acquisition, the greater the efficiency gains resulting
from competitive bidding relative to the efficiency losses from the
potential decrease in the number of tender offers.
A final objection to a standard prohibiting a target from seeking
competitive bids focuses on a more practical but, I think, equflly
important level: The role assigned target management by such a
standard is unrealistic in tender offer settings. A common opening of
the tender offer process is the receipt by the target of a letter asking
to negotiate a friendly acquisition, but with the threat, implicit or
195. "The checks on unfair dealing by the parent are few. In theory, of course, the
fairness of the parent's behavior is subject to the check of judicial review; but in practice such
review is difficult even where the courts have the will to engage in it, and they often lack the
will." M. EISENBERG, supra note 28, at 309 (citations omitted); see Cary, supra note 11, at
679-83.
196. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
197. Jarrell & Bradley, sura note 86, at 382.
198. The data do not, however, rule out the possibility that the acquirer secures its
return by displacing inefficient management but then disproportionately appropriates the
gains from increased efficiency. While this result is possible, it seems to me less likely than the
synergistic explanation. Appropriation of benefits in a parent-subsidiary relationship takes
place through intercompany dealings, like transfer pricing in a vertically integrated affiliated
group. The opportunities for such dealings increase with greater operational or financial relations between the parent and the subsidiary. The greater these relations, however, the more
likely that there was a synergistic motivation for the transaction in the first place. Of course,
even a completely diversified conglomerate can overcharge subsidiaries for central services,
like accounting, employee benefit plans and the like, which do not require a special relationship between the characters of the companies, but at the same time the opportunity for misappropriation is of a significantly lower magnitude.
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explicit, of a hostile tender offer if negotiations are refused or fail.' 99
May target management seek alternative offers at this point, or must
competitive bidding, if it is to take place at all, only come when the
very first contact is initiated by the target? If the latter standard is
required, the offeror community should strategically respond by
making tender offers as early as possible in order to neutralize target
management. But this turns the original justification for the tender
offers on its head. Negotiated transactions are preferable because
management is more knowledgeable and skillful than the shareholders, and because shareholder action incurs substantial coordination
costs. 2 °0

The tender offer is a monitoring mechanism.

If manage-

ment cannot bargain on the shareholders' behalf, offerors will bypass
management entirely. The result is that the monitoring mechanism
displaces the activity it was supposed to monitor.
V.

REDUCING THE STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE TO A RULE

In an important sense, my argument has come full circle. There
has never been significant judicial debate over the principle that selfperpetuating action by target management is invalid. The difficulty,
I have argued, has been the courts' inability to distinguish defensive
tactics from neutral corporate action, particularly where dual effects
are present.2 0 ' The traditional solution-an inquiry into motivefails not in principle, but in implementation, in reducing the principle to a form which meaningfully separates management conduct
into valid and invalid categories. This task still remains.
The effort, however, can now begin from a substantially different
position. Unlike courts confronting the matter originally, we now
understand the tender offer's role in the corporate structure and the
relationship between management and shareholders dictated by that
role. We have seen that the tender offer is centrally important to the
structure of the corporation because it is the key displacement mechanism through which the market for corporate control constrains
management behavior and because it is a critical safety valve against
management's misuse of its controlling role in all other displacement
mechanisms. 2 Its success depends on independent shareholder action; shareholders tendering their shares transfer control to better
199. See A. FLEISCHER, sua note 2, at 57-59; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra

note 2, at
200.
201.
202.

40-49.
See notes 101, 175-76 supra.
See notes 25-44 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 84-98 supra and accompanying text.
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management, and it is the potential for such shareholder action
which constrains self-interested behavior by management in connection with mergers and asset sales. A structural approach to allocating responsibility between management and shareholders with
respect to tender offers thus yields a straightforward principle:
Shareholders must make tender offer decisions.
Before formulating a rule implementing that principle, it is worth
pausing to identify the benefits which derive from a structural approach. The major pitfalls facing courts in reviewing management
action under traditional standards are no longer present. It is simply
no longer relevant to inquire whether management action was in the
best interests of the shareholders, a question which, if confronted
rather than avoided through the subterfuge of motive, requires judicial review of the alternative futures presented by the contestants for
control. The structural principle focuses on how management action
affects the role assigned to shareholders, a factual inquiry which
ought not to pose special difficulties to courts. This question is one
which the court is institutionally competent to answer.
We can now formulate a rule which reflects the allocation of responsibility between management and shareholders dictated by the
structurally derived principle. While no model for such a rule exists
in this country, extending our vision to the United Kingdom uncovers an approach which, at least in broad outline, seems worthy of
emulation.
A.

The City Code and a StructuralFormulation

Tender offer regulation in the United Kingdom is bifurcated between governmental regulation and industry self-regulation. The
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958203 and the Licensed
Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules,20 4 together with the Memorandum of Guidance of the Federation of Stock Exchanges, 0 5 regulate
the formal mechanism by which an offer may be made. However,
neither these provisions nor the Companies Act of 1948206 regulates
203. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45.
204. STAT. INST. 1960, no. 1216, reprinted in M. WEINBERG, TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 414 app. (3d ed. 1971). These rules are promulgated by the Department of Trade pursuant to § 7 of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, and are commonly referred to as the
Board of Trade Rules. M. WEINBERG, sura, at 111-12.
205. FEDERATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN GREAT BRITAIN & IRELAND, ADMISSION
OF SECURITIES TO QUOTATION: MEMORANDA OF GUIDANCE (1964), reprintedin M. WEINBERG, sufira note 204, at 424 app.

206.

ii & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38.
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target companies' conduct in response to a bid.2 °7 This conduct falls
within the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers208 which was written and is administered by an industry group, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. 0 9
The City Code2 '0 allocates roles between management and shareholders in a manner similar to that which I have argued derives from
the corporate structure. Professor Weinberg, a principal commentator on the Code, has described as one of the "[t]wo main, though
interrelated, threads [which] run through the provisions of the Code
• . .that it is for the offeree shareholders to decide whether or not an
offer shall succeed." 21 1 The language of General Principle 4 most
clearly reflects this theme:
At no time after a bona ftde offer has been communicated to the
Board of an offeree company or after the Board of an offeree company has reason to believe that a bonafide offer might be imminent
shall any action be taken.
207.

. .

which could effectively result in...

1 PALMER'S COMPANY LAw 858 (22d ed. 1976); Pennington, Takeover Bids in the

UnitedKingdom, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 159, 169 (1969).

Sections 191, 192 and 193 of the Com-

panies Act, however, do constrain the receipt by target management of compensation for
resignation of their offices, or for aid in the transfer of control, without approval by the shareholders following disclosure. A. CONARD, supra note 49, at 209-10.
208.

PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND

MERGERS (rev. ed. 1976), reprinted in 3 PALMER'S COMPANY LAW, supra note 207, at 4505
[hereinafter cited as THE CITY CODE].
209. The Code was originally published in March, 1968, and was the product of a committee organized by the Bank of England. The Committee included representatives of the
Accepting Houses Committee (merchant banks), the Association of Investment Trusts, the
British Insurance Association, The London Clearing Bankers' Committee (joint stock banks),
the Confederation of British Industry, the Federation of Stock Exchanges, and the National
Association of Pension Funds. Pennington, supra note 207, at 172. That the self-regulation
reflected in the City Code was an effort to head off governmental regulation was openly
acknowledged in the Introduction to the April, 1969 edition, reprintedin M. WEINBERG, supra
note 204, at 437 app.: "It is generally accepted that the choice before the City in the conduct
of Take-overs and Mergers is either a system of voluntary self-discipline based on the Code
and administered by the City's own representatives or regulation by law enforced by officials
appointed by Government."
While the Code provides a mechanism by which complaints may be made and commented upon, with the decision subject to an appeals process, the Panel has no independent
authority to impose sanctions beyond public criticism, although the Stock Exchange Council
and other organizations may themselves impose sanctions on members for violation of the
Code. M. WEINBERG, supra note 204, at 122, 126-29; Pennington, supra note 207, at 177.
210. The Code consists of 12 General Principles and 39 Rules. In addition, the Panel
from time to time issues Practice Notes which clarify the Panel's understanding of one or
more of the Principles or Rules. See general(y THE CrrY CODE, supra note 208.
211. M. WEINBERG, supra note 204, at 123. The second main thread is "that there must
be equitable treatment as between the various shareholders of the offeree company .
id
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the shareholders of the offeree company being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits.
It is reassuring that a major commercial jurisdiction operates
with a rule which allocates tender offer roles in a manner consistent
with those which I have argued derive from the structure of the corporation. Beyond reassurance, however, the generality of the approach reflected in General Principle 4 is instructive. It describes the
effect to be avoided-interfering with shareholder decision-rather
than specifying the particular techniques likely to have that effect.
And in contrast to a more detailed code of prohibited conduct, such
a general approach is particularly suited tojudicial adoption.
These last points raise the questions of the appropriate institution
to adopt a structural approach to target company defensive tactics
and the form of rule I would propose. I believe it wholly appropriate
that courts should undertake the recommended doctrinal shift rather
than await the imprimatur of legislative action. In important respects, the operative principle governing the allocation of responsibility for tender offers between management and shareholders is a
direct outgrowth of traditional fiduciary doctrine whose development was unabashedly based on the relationships established but not
defined by the corporation statute. The principle I have identified
does no more than extend that form of analysis-inherently structural in character-to a fiduciary problem-management self-interest with respect to potential changes in control-not adequately
treated by present doctrine. This is certainly an important change,
but the change reflects an approach pioneered by and entirely suitable for continued development by the courts.
We can now formulate a rule which reflects both the structurally
defined roles for management and shareholders and the City Code's
attractive general approach. Recognizing that the desired generality
lessens the demand upon the drafter, the following is a workable solution:
During the period commencing with the date on which target management has reason to believe that a tender offer may be made for
part or all of a target company's equity securities, and ending at
212. THE CITY CODE, supra note 208, Gen. Prin. 4. The terms of General Principle 4
are expanded upon in Rule 38, which provides: "During the course of an offer, or even before
the date of the offer if the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bonafde
offer might be imminent, the board must not,. . . issue any authorized but unissued shares,
or issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares, create or issue or permit the creation or issue of any securities carrying rights of conversion into or subscription for shares of
the company, or sell, dispose of or acquire or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire assets of
material amount or enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business."
Id, Rule 38.
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such time thereafter that the offeror shall have had a reasonable
period in which to present the offer to target shareholders, no action shall be taken by the target company which could interfere
with the success of the offer or result in the shareholders of the target company being denied the opportunity to tender their shares,
except that the target company (1) may disclose to the public or its
shareholders information bearing on the value or the attractiveness
of the offer,213 and (2) may seek out alternative transactions
2 14 which
it believes may be more favorable to target shareholders.

Limiting target management conduct by focusing on its effect on
shareholder decision highlights the most important manner in which
the rule differs from the traditional inquiry. The central difficulty
with the policy conflict/primary purpose test is that it assigns management an important discretionary role in the tender offer process.
So long as management "genuinely" concludes that an offeror's policy differs from its own, or otherwise determines that an offer is "not
in the best interest of the corporation or its shareholders," traditional
doctrine validates defensive action. Subject only to the effectiveness
of the defensive tactic selected, target management is, in effect, authorized to act instead of the shareholders. So understood, the common criticism of traditional doctrine-that the tests are
indeterminate because it is impossible to differentiate situations
where there realy are policy differences, or where management reallY
believes it is acting in the best interests of the corporation or shareholders, from situations where such assertions are only a ploy-is beside the point. Under a structural approach the issue is not the
wisdom or good faith of particular action, but simply whether, and
what kind of, action has been taken. In other words, the approach
has the flavor of ultra vires-certain actions are simply outside management's authority.
This distinction, between identifying appropriate areas of management activity and identifying whether particular activity was correct or was taken for proper reasons, also distinguishes the proposed
rule from other reform efforts. With few exceptions,2 15 proposed re213. Management's role in providing shareholders information is discussed in notes
166-172 supra and accompanying text.
214. Management's bargaining role is discussed in notes 173-200supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that General Principle 4 has an exception, deleted from the
quotation in the text at note 212 suhra, for action approved by shareholders. In light of
management's advantages in the use of the proxy system, see notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text, I see no reason to substitute a formal vote by proxy for direct shareholder action
taken by means of their decision whether to tender their shares.
215. See Easterbrook & Fischel, sumpra note 181 (requirement of management passivity);
Weiss, Tender Ofers and Management Respoaibility, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 445, 453 (1978). It is
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forms, although manipulating the measure or burden of proof, have
retained traditional fiduciary analysis as a framework. Thus, critics
have suggested that the burden of proof be shifted to management
and that management be required to show a "compelling business
purpose" for the questioned action, 216thor that the result of the action
was "fair, ' 2 17 or that management had objective reasons to believe
that defeating the offer would result in shareholders receiving "their
highest investment return. ' 2 8 Alternatively, recognizing the difficulty in separating pure from tainted motives, it has been suggested
that procedural, rather than substantive, standards be used to validate management action. For example, Chairman Williams has
urged that defensive action by target management be permitted if
authorized by independent directors after reasonable investigation.2 19
not entirely clear where Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,
64 CORNELL L.Q. 901 (1979), come out. While the authors correctly focus on tactics which
"preclude or otherwise materially impede the target's shareholders' consideration of the offer," id at 927, they nonetheless would allow management to show "that the primary reason
for the action was not to effectively impede shareholder consideration of the offer," id at 928,
thereby resurrecting motive analysis.
216. This standard was adopted in Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.
1975), in which a number of defensive tactics were invalidated. Applying California law,
Judge Choy rejected the policy conflict/primary purpose approach, id at 233, and, relying on
the California Supreme Court's opinion in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460
P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969), suggested "a balancing of the good to the corporation
against the disproportionate advantage to the majority shareholders and incumbent management." 528 F.2d at 234. The court's explicit reliance on Ahmanson-a case dealing with the
obligations of a majority shareholder-as the source of its new rule, and the presence of a
majority shareholder in Klaus, leaves unclear whether the court would also reject the policy
conflict/primary purpose test when there is no majority shareholder and there is only professional management attempting to protect their positions.
217. Where a decision to adopt a defensive tactic has not been made through a procedurally acceptable mechanism, Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Ofer, 60 B.U. L. REV. 403, 470-72 (1980), recommend a fairness
standard be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
218. Note, CorporateDirectors' Liabilig for Resisting a Tender Offer: PoposedSubstantive and
ProceduralModifiations of Existing State and Fiduciap Standards, 32 VAND. L. REv. 575, 603-04
(1979) (directors must show that "they reasonably believed, as a result of objective investigation, that defeating the tender offer would yield target shareholders their highest investment
return"). Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 181, at 1203, would allow, as an exception to their
requirement that management remain passive, justification of postoffer tactics by proof that
the actions were undertaken for the economic benefit of the target. The rule I propose does
not offer such an exception; its unlimited character is discussed in text accompanying note
220 infia.
219. H. Williams, supra note 115, at 82,880-82 (use of a special committee of independent directors); cf. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 217, at 467-70 (adoption of defensive tactics by independent directors with professional financial assistance allows application of the
business judgment rule).
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The problem with all of these approaches is the underlying premise that target management under some circumstances can preempt
shareholder decision in a tender offer. And the mistake of ever allowing target management to displace shareholder decision is exacerbated because neither a "higher" standard nor relying on the
decisionmakers' independence provides any guidance in determining
the bounds of management's preemptive role. The notion of "compelling business purpose" directs courts to undertake balancing, but
does not elucidate what factors ought to weigh in the balance and
how much weight should be accorded each. Nor is the failure to
delineate target management's role remedied by relying on independent directors. Without substantive guidance as to the appropriate scope of their activity and that of the shareholders,
independent directors are left free to define their role themselves. Although presumably less tainted by self-interest, a decision by independent directors to defeat an offer for nonpersonal reasons, such
as a sense of responsibility to the town in which the company's major
facilities are located, provides only a bootstrap justification for the
directors having that discretion in the first place. 220 The rule I propose suffers neither from indeterminacy nor from lack of a normative
foundation. Other criticisms are possible, however, and warrant anticipation and response.
B.

Criticisms of a Role Allocation Rule
1. Generality of language.

The generality of the proposed rule suggests the criticism that it
will be too ambiguous to provide effective guidance for target management or permit consistent application by judges. What does it
mean to "interfere with the success of an offer" or to deny target
shareholders "the opportunity to tender their shares"? In this sense
the criticism is similar to that directed at the traditional policy conflict/primary purpose test: that it is incapable of reasoned application.
220. A part of the problem turns on the difficulty of defining independence. Even if
there are noftnancial ties between the target corporation and the directors, how independent,
at least with respect to the issue of adopting defensive tactics, is a director who is also the chief
executive officer of a company perceived as a potential target? The problem is exacerbated
since so many outside directors in publicly held corporations are executives with other companies. See, e.g., M. MACE, supra note 78, at 86-110. Thus, while the outside directors may be
financially independent-independent with respect to the financial terms of their relationship
to the target--they may well not be attitudinally independent-independent with respect to
the appropriate role of directors and shareholders in decisionmaking concerning tender offers.
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This kind of criticism, however, focuses on the wrong type of ambiguity. The traditional standard and alternate reforms are ambiguous not because of the generality of their language, but because they
reflect no clear notion of the appropriate role of management in
tender offers. The proposed rule focuses on the primacy of the shareholder decision: Management actions which facilitate that decision-disclosing information or seeking a better offer-are justified;
actions interfering with that decision-such as scorched earth campaigns22' or efforts to initiate governmental action against the offeror 222 -are not. The impact of management action on the
opportunity for shareholder decision is a relatively narrow factual
question. The ambiguity present in competing standards-the absence of any clear basis on which to determine whether management
223
activity is proper-simply does not exist under the proposed rule.
While criticism of the proposed rule based on the ambiguity of its
language may be unwarranted, the rule's generality may elicit a
more carefully framed attack. In recent years it has been recognized
that, assuming a consistent intent with respect to substantive coverage, the manner in which the activity to be regulated is defined can
have an important impact on the results of the regulatory effort.2 24
As an initial matter, a prohibitory rule may be drafted to fit any
point along a continuum ranging from generality to specificity. For
example, a traffic law could prohibit, on the one hand, driving at an
221. A "scorched earth" defense seeks to convince the offeror that the defense will be so
vigorous as to destroy the target's value to the offeror. Gurwin, The Scorched Earth olicy,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1979, at 33-35. An example of this approach was the successful effort of Houghton Mifflin to convince its authors to advise an offeror that they would
sever their relationships with the target if the offer was successful. Id at 40.
222. Interposing governmental regulatory machinery may have the effect of dissipating
corporate assets if the result is to limit the target's activity; if directed at the offeror, it may
simply increase the effective price to the offeror without increasing the price to the target
shareholders.
223. A similar distinction was drawn recently by Professor Chirelstein in considering the
prospect of legislative answers to other fiduciary problems. See Chirelstein, Legislative Solutions
for Fiduciag Problems, in The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the
Subcomm on Citizens' andShareholders'RightsandRemedies of the Senate Comm on theJudidag', 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1977). Noting that "the term 'fiduciary duty' means nothing unless we
give it context and state precisely what it is that a fiduciary is obligated to do," id at 264,
Professor Chirelstein concluded that "the problems are complex and cannot be resolved simply through an exercise of intuition about what is fair," id at 268.
224. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 424; Ehrlich & Posner, An EconoaicAnalysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268-69 (1974); Wittman, PriorRegulation Versus Post
Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977). See
generally Stone, The Placeof EnterpriseLiability in the Controlof Corporate Conduct, 90 YAIE LJ. 1
(1980). The discussion which follows owes much to the Ehrlich & Posner analysis.
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unsafe speed or, on the other, driving in excess of 35 miles per
hour.22 5 In the tender offer context, one might implement the structural principle governing the allocation of management and shareholder roles by a fairly general statement, such as the one I propose,
or by specific rules identifying precisely those activities in which
management may not engage. Understanding and responding to the
criticism that the proposed rule is "too general" means considering
the effects on regulatory effectiveness of movements along the generality/specificity continuum.
Professors Erhlich and Posner have demonstrated that, other
things being equal, the more specific the prohibition, the less likely it
is to deter socially desirable behavior not intended to be prohibited.
Uncertainty concerning whether particular conduct is prohibited deters that conduct; precision, by reducing the uncertainty, reduces the
unintended deterrence.2 26 The move toward specificity, however, is
not costless. The more specific the prohibition, the more likely it is
that undesirable conduct, which was intended to be prohibited and
would have been covered by a more general prohibition, will not be
barred.22 7
Thus, a specific rule deters less, and a general rule more, conduct
whether desirable or undesirable. Criticism of the generality of the
proposed rule then must be based on the claim that there is a marginal benefit from moving toward a more specific rule-that the benefit from reducing unintended deterrence of desirable activity exceeds
the cost of increasing the incidence of undesirable activity. Evaluating such criticism requires both a measure of the amount of activity
deterred by a more or less specific formulation and a measure of how
desirable is the conduct unintentionally deterred and how undesirable is the conduct intended to be forbidden.2 28
How much activity is deterred? First, consider moving toward a more
general rule. In a tender offer this means increasing the risk that a
desirable activity-one with an operational benefit but which does
not impair shareholder access to an offer, such as the expenditure of
225.
226.
227.
228.
where:
AD
KD
AU
Ku

Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 224, at 257.
Id at 262, 268-69.
Id
For example, a move to a more specific rule will be desirable if AD'KD>AU'KU
=
=
=
=

increase in desirable activity
desirability coefficient
increase in undesirable activity
undesirability coefficient
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cash on a capital investment-is deterred because of increased uncertainty as to whether it is covered by the prohibition. This deterrence
results, of course, from the decision calculus of management-a balance of the potential benefit to the corporation against the risk that
the activity will cause the directors to violate the rule.
In this situation, there is an asymmetry in the incidence of potential benefits and burdens resulting from the decision. While the benefits from the activity flow, at least in the first instance, to the
corporation, the burden of violation falls on management. 229 The
extent to which desirable activity is deterred by moving toward a
more general rule depends on both the extent to which management
perceives the benefit to the corporation as a personal benefit and the
directors' attitude toward risk.
Next, consider moving toward a more specific rule forbidding
precisely identified types of activities. The concern is the extent to
which this movement permits undesirable activity-in structural
terms, actions which interfere with the shareholders' role in tender
offers-because of the increased likelihood that a particular activity
will fall outside the rule. In this situation, the decision calculus shifts
significantly. Because the activity is undesirable based on our general principle, the benefit of acting-blocking the tender offer-accrues to management, and the burden resulting from the activitythe failure of the offer-will fall on the shareholders.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the character of the decisionmaker is quite significant in determining the impact of alternative formulations of a regulatory principle.2 30 Other things being
equal, one would expect a move toward a more general rule to have a
greater deterrence effect on desirable activity if the board were independent than if the board were controlled by management. Corporate success determines inside management's professional success
229. Although there has not yet been a monetary recovery from a director for authorizing defensive tactics, the prayers for damages in prominent cases have been enormous. For
example, Marshall Fields shareholders requested $236 million and Gerber shareholders some
$100 million. In each case the amount sought represented the entire amount of the lost premium. Gelfond & Sebastian, supra note 217, at 648 n.415. Additionally, the question has
been raised as to whether such damages would be excluded from standard directors' and
officers' liability insurance policies. Id In fact, the measure of damages in this setting is
difficult. While the shareholders may have "lost" the premium offered, they would have been
required to give up their stock to secure it. The result of the director conduct complained of,
however, is that they still have their stock which, presumably, would still command some
premium from someone on a takeover. Perhaps the directors should be allowed to secure an
alternative takeover following determination of liability in order to "mitigate" damages.
230. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 224, at 263, 271.
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to a far greater degree than that of outside directors, so that the benefit from activity which benefits the corporation is more personal to
the inside director and, thus, more likely to outweigh the risk of personal liability. Also, outside directors are likely to be more riskaverse than operating management. Reputation and professional
standing provide an important source of satisfaction-and future directorships-for independent directors, and these attributes are particularly subject to risk of liability.2"'
The impact of a move toward a more specific rule is also influenced by the character of the decisionmaker. The activity in question is detrimental-antitakeover-so that its benefit, protecting
incumbency, is likely to matter more to inside management than to
independent directors. Therefore, a specific rule will result in more
undesirable activity if the board is management controlled.
Independent directors can then be expected to undertake less antitakeover conduct than management directors with both specific
and general rules. 23 2 But while this makes independent boards desir-

able, the possibility of an independent board does not, at first cut,
justify preferring a specific or general rule. A closer look, however,
indicates that a specific rule may limit the beneficial influence of independent directors.
The more specific a rule, the more likely professional counsel will
be relied on to interpret it. 23 3 The point can be made by contrasting

a general standard-like the best interests of the corporation-which
has a large intuitive element, with more complicated rules-like Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code-which defy nonexpert in234
Consider the impact of outside advice on
terpretation.
independent directors. Rather than being able to form an independent judgment concerning an activity's appropriateness, they must
rely on an expert-usually a lawyer. But management, rather than
231. See Gurwin, supra note 221, at 35, 44; Useem, The Social Organization of the American
Business Eliteand Participationof CorporateDirectorsin the Governance ofAmerican Institutions, 44 AM.
Soc. REv. 553 (1979).
232. This conclusion provides the conceptual underpinning for the type of reform, recommended by Harold Williams and others, which essentially ignores the substance of the
allocation of decisionmaking between management and shareholders in favor of reliance on
decisions by independent directors. See note 219 supra and accompanying text.
233. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 224, at 270-71.
234. Id; cf. Clark, The Regulation ofFinancialHolding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REv. 787,
840 (1979) ("[F]lat prohibitions would probably deter many unfair transactions that would
otherwise have been carried out by managers able to persuade themselves and their peers, in
view of factual complexities and multiple considerations, that the deals were not clearly unfair.").
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the independent directors, selects and compensates counsel, whether
in-house or outside, and counsel thus has a substantial incentive to
devise defensive tactics which it can advise the independent directors
are lawful.23 5 Counsel's incentive to find the "right" answer is accentuated by the heterogeneous character of the activities which must be
covered by the specific rules. If the rule describes the form of the
prohibited tactic rather than merely its effect-which is presumably
what distinguishes a specific from a general rule-it is likely that motivated, inventive counsel will be able to restructure defensive transactions and tactics to fall outside the form prohibited by the rule
without changing the substantive result-a problem which has been
endemic to all efforts to regulate commercial transactions. 3 6 Thus,
more specific rules not only encourage undesirable conduct, but because of the likely role of counsel, they also reduce the benefits one
would otherwise expect from the presence of outside directors.
The importance of the deterredactivity. The above discussion indicates
that a general rule is preferable to a specific rule with respect to the
relative amounts of desirable and undesirable conduct deterred. But it
may still be that the additional deterrence of a more general rule is
less important than the loss of benefits from the desirable conduct
unintentionally deterred, even recognizing that specific rules provide
less than proportional amounts of deterrence.2 3 7
In fact, it is not clear that very much desirable activity actually
will be deterred by a general rule like that proposed. Most importantly, the proposed rule has a temporal limit which serves to control
the extent of its unintended deterrence in a fashion not present with
the side effects of a more specific rule. For example, assume that the
235. The general problem of the responsiveness of outside counsel to management has
been considered principally in the context of the independence of a director who is also the
firm's outside counsel. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON CORPORATE AccOUNTABILITY 452-57 (Comm.

Print 1980) and sources cited therein; f McAdams, A Proposalto Amend the Indemnifwation
Section (§ 5) of the Model Business CorporationAct, 31 Bus. LAW. 2123, 2138-39 (1976) (suggesting restricted role for "independent legal counsel" in authorizing indemnification of corporate employee).
236. Cf Deutsch, The Mysteries of CorporateLaw: A Response to Bntadn and Chirelstezn, 88
YALE LJ. 235, 237 (1978) (Correspondence) ("T]he clearer and more uniform a rule is, the
more likely it is to be regarded as a formality that can justifiably be manipulated so long as
compliance with its explicit formulation is maintained.'). Perhaps the best example is the
"form vs. substance" doctrine in tax law, where the courts have tried to cope with the problem presented by practitioners' ability to restructure transactions in accordance with the
terms of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations without altering their economic substance.

237. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 224, at 271.
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proposed rule would have prevented Goodrich from purchasing
Gulf's joint venture interest, 238 and further assume that the purchase
was desirable regardless of the Northwest tender. Since the proposed
rule is limited to a reasonable period following announcement of an
offer, it can only delay, not prevent, the transaction. If the shareholders reject the offer, management is free to proceed with the transaction. And if the offer is successful, new management can proceed
with the transaction if it still appears desirable. While there may be
some transactions where delay will prove lethal, the number is likely
to be small given the overall complexity of major corporate transactions. In a number of the decided cases, including Goodrich, involving
activity of the sort which would be deterred by the proposed rule, it
was precisely the haste with which the transaction occurred which
239
suggested its defensive character.
The importance of the tender offer in the structure of the corporation, together with the reduction in the deterrent effect of independent directors resulting from more specific rules and the
comparatively limited impact of a general rule on desirable activity,
reinforce my conclusion that the general approach reflected by the
proposed rule is preferable. But while the preceding discussion does
confront the criticism that the proposed rule is too general, another
criticism can also be anticipated-that the proposed rule is too specific.
2.

The pre- vs. postoffer line.

The proposed rule, which limits target management conduct only
after management becomes aware that an offer is forthcoming, can
also be criticized as being too specific in its time dimension. The rule
does not proscribe-indeed, does not even address-management
conduct occurring prior to awareness of the imminence of a particular offer. 24 Why, one might complain, is the proposed rule so limited? What constraints apply in the pre-offer period?
238. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
239. It defies belief that the Goodrich-Gulf transaction, having been dormant for four
years, would have been prevented by an additional delay during which Goodrich shareholders determined whether to tender their shares to Northwest Industries. Similar timing issues
appear to have been a factor in, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 234 (9th Cir.
1975) ("Hi-Shear did not suggest any compelling reason why ESOT had to be established at
a time so advantageous to those in control rather than a few months later. . . ."); Applied
Digital Data Sys. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc.
v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863
(C.D. Cal. 1976).
240. A critic could also argue that terms such as "reason to believe" and "interfere with
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I do not, of course, believe that management should be free to
build a defensive fortress in the pre-offer period. Defensive tactics,
whether pre- or postoffer, are inconsistent with the allocation of roles
between shareholders and management dictated by the structure of
the corporation. But while the principle involved in pre-offer tactics
is the same, and while it might be possible to extend the rulemaking
effort to the pre-offer period as well, I think the need is significantly
less pressing than in the postoffer period.
Unlike postoffer defensive strategies, which can be carefully formulated to strike only the interloper without significantly affecting
operating performance, pre-offer strategies are necessarily more general. Consider, for example, one possible pre-offer defensive tactic:
an acquisition designed to make the company a less attractive target.
During the pre-offer period, the target company does not know the
identity of the potential offeror nor, in light of the continued popularity of diversifying and conglomerate mergers, perhaps even the potential offeror's industry. Thus, the deterrence must be general. The
acquisition must deter undesired offers because it makes the target
less desirable generally rather than because it presents a carefully tailored antitrust obstacle. 24' But to the extent this or other tactics
make the target company generally less attractive, such decreased attractiveness should be reflected in a lower price for the company's
stock. That decrease, in turn, should leave the target company an
equally attractive takeover candidate; indeed, it may have the ironic
effect of making the target more attractive, especially if the particular
defensive operating strategy adopted can be reversed by the offeror
and the effects remedied. 24 2 In short, pre-offer tactics are simply less
likely to be effective.
the success" may be too general. Whether the criticism is characterized one of ambiguity or
of deterring too much desirable conduct, the response has been given in text.
241. This point can be clarified by considering the screening role played by outside
counsel. Just as counsel for the offeror is capable of making a reasoned judgment concerning
the legality of a proposed acquisition under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), so
may counsel for the target advise on the effectiveness of each potential defensive acquisition
in light of the identity of the offeror. Where the offeror is still unknown, counsel's advice is
limited to general statements concerning what might help if the potential offeror fell within
one or another broad category.
A second example of this point is made in Nathan & Sobel, supra note 29, in connection
with an issuer's repurchase of its outstanding shares as a defensive tactic. While the authors
conclude that a pre-offer repurchase of its own shares by a potential target may result in
having used "the issuer's cash or credit to finance a portion of the [anticipated] acquisition,"
id at 1546-47, they also point out that a repurchase directly from the potential offeror, once
the offeror has been identified, "may be an effective way for an issuer to reduce the odds that
it will become the target of an unsolicited takeover bid," id at 1551.
242. The experience of the Kennecott Copper Company illustrates this point. As a re-
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Finally, some of the most popular pre-offer tactics can be dealt
with by traditional doctrine. Consider inserting a "change in management" clause in a target company loan agreement. 243 The corporation cannot be served by the action except to the extent that it is
appropriate in all settings for management to prevent displacement. 2" Traditional doctrine would permit this action in the postoffer period-as long as target management demonstrated that it had a
policy conflict with the particular offeror, and that the tactic was an
appropriate part of an attempt to defeat the offer. In the pre-offer
period, however, the identity of the offeror is not known, so the policy
conflict rationale cannot be used to justify the action.2 45 Absent a
suit of the sale of Peabody Coal Company pursuant to the order of the Federal Trade Commission, Kennecott found itself with some $800 million in cash and $400 million in 30 year
notes--a hoard which made it an attractive target. The following year, in a move widely
viewed as defensive, Kennecott paid $567 million in cash to acquire the Carborundum Company. This acquisition was followed by an accumulation of Kennecott stock by CurtissWright, which then waged an unsuccessful proxy fight for control of Kennecott on the platform that Carborundum should be sold and the proceeds used for a substantial distribution to
shareholders. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978)
(discussing history); Kennecott,for Years King of Copper Miners, Suffers Strng of Crises, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1. To forestall a second round of the proxy contest, Kennecott announced a tender offer for the outstanding shares of Curtiss-Wright, and Curtiss-Wright responded with a tender for its own stock. See Kennecott's Battle with Curtiss-Wniht Involves
Ambitions, Strategies and Mone, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1980, at 6, col. 3. The complicated settlement eventually reached by the parties is discussed in Kennecott and Curtiss-Wright End Corporate
Battle by Agreeing to a 10- Year Trce Involving $280 Million, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
The final chapter in the Kennecott saga was the announcement that it was to be acquired by
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), a transaction reportedly motivated by the weakening effects of the
long conflict on Kennecott. Kennecott HoldersApprove Takeover ofFirr by Sohio, Wall St. J., May
6, 1981, at 20, col. 4.
The consequences of some actions taken by target management, however, may be irreparable. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
243. Such a clause allows the lender to require immediate prepayment if management
changes. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 36; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 2, at
272.
244. While there are circumstances where a change in control clause is desired by the
lender or other party to the supply relationship, the basis is that party's concern that a change
in management would affect the corporation's credit-worthiness or ability to perform. If the
clause is proposed by the target, there is at least a strong implication that it is not independently attractive to the other party and, therefore, the target will receive nothing in exchange
for limiting its future flexibility.
245. Shark repellent amendments--alterations in the company's articles of incorporation or bylaws designed to make the company a less attractive target-present a number of
issues different from those posed by other defensive tactics, issues that make more difficult the
application of either traditional doctrine or a structural approach. First, the crucial characteristic of shark repellent amendments--supermajority vote requirements-appears to be expressly contemplated by the common statutory authorization of shareholder vote
requirements higher than those specified in the statute. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5)
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promanagement shift in the traditional standard, pre-offer tactics
which can have no business purpose should thus be in jeopardy
under the traditional measure of management's fiduciary duty.2"
VI.

CONCLUSION

Almost twenty years ago Bayless Manning announced the death
of corporation law "as a field of intellectual effort."2'47 Noting the
demise of the nineteenth-century notion that the corporation, like Pinocchio, was to be treated like a "real boy," Manning offered the
following image:
When American law ceased to take the "corporation" seriously, the
entire body of law that had been built upon that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We have nothing left but
our great empty corporation statutes-towering skyscrapers of
(West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (4) (1975); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. 2D § 143 (1971). This barrier is not presented by other defensive tactics. Second,
shark repellent amendments are commonly adopted in the pre-offer period, thus falling
outside the scope of the proposed rule. Because some forms of amendment have justifications
other than their impact on potential offerors, traditional fiduciary doctrine also has little
promise of effectively controlling them. Resolution of these problems requires more attention
than is possible here and is the subject of my forthcoming article, The Case Against SharkRepellent Amendments.
246. A possible problem with my view that the proposed rule is an outgrowth of existing
law, however, is the reference in recent judicial opinions to an affirmative "duty to defend"
against undesirable tender offers. Because this doctrine may be seen as explicitly acknowledging a management role which conflicts with the proposed rule, some attention to its origin
and content is appropriate. The notion arose initially as unsupported dictum in an opinion
justifying defensive tactics in the postoffer period by application of the traditional standard.
Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
("[M]anagement has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its shareholders."). It has since become commonplace. See, e.g.,
Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,603
(2d Cir. 1980); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1980), afd, Nos. 80-1375, 80-1389 (7th Cir. Apr. 2,
1981); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
Although neither analysis nor authority for the concept has yet been offered, it has been
repeated, albeit apparently in dicta, with sufficient frequency that it may be viewed as a
barrier to judicial adoption of the rule I propose. It is thus important to understand that a
suitably limited "duty to oppose" is not inconsistent with the proposed rule's limits on activity
by target management during a tender offer.
Under the proposed rule management opposition to an offer which takes the form of
providing information to shareholders or of securing alternative offers is permissible because
such activity facilitates shareholder decision rather than supplanting it. As so limited, a management duty to oppose a proposed tender offer may indeed be in the shareholders' best
interests. Under these circumstances, of course, the appropriate measure of management's
satisfaction of its "duty" would be the business judgment rule.
247. Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisalRemedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ.
223, 245 n.37 (1962).
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rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing

but wind.24 8
A structural approach to the corporation, here used to allocate
responsibility between management and shareholders in tender offers, is an effort to add substance to the abandoned statutory skeleton
described by Manning by integrating the influence of the markets in
which the corporation and its participants function. But while that
substance derives from developments in modern economic and
financial theory, more is required to rehabilitate the intellectual edifice of corporate law than simply recognizing the existence and importance of related disciplines. 49 We must mesh the insights of those
disciplines with legal doctrine if courts and legislatures are to successfully adopt new standards for management and corporate behavior.
The structure which results is a statutory framework buttressed
by behavioral engineering. It promises an integrity which nineteenth-century corporate legal fiction never possessed, and an institutional setting which a purely behavioral insight cannot provide. The
structure thus recognizes the importance of markets in giving substance to the statutory skeleton, and places them in the regulatory
context in which they function.

248. Id
249. One ought not, however, to underestimate the importance of that recognition.
The major books used to teach basic corporations and securities law, e.g., W. CARY & M.
EISENBERO, supra note 104; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 101; D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. 1980); D. VAGTS, MATERIALS ON BASIC CORPORATION LAW (2d

ed. 1979), are almost entirely silent with respect to the relevance of economic and financial
theory. Recent and very helpful exceptions include V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 71; ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAv AND SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 116;
W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE (1979).

